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ABSTRACT 
In 1841, with the involvement of European powers, the Ottoman 
Empire distinguished by Firman territory subject to a Khedive of Egypt 
from that subject more directly to Istanbul. With British pressure in 
1906, a more formal boundary was established between Egypt and Ottoman 
Palestine. This study focuses on these events and on the history from 
1841 to the present. The study area includes the Sinai peninsula and 
extends from the Suez Canal in the west to what is today southern Israel 
from Ashqelon on the Mediterranean to the southern shore of the Dead Sea 
in the east. Both alterations in the boundary and changes in its 
function are considered. A set of maps describes the stages of boundary 
development and changes in its exact location. 
Subsequent to Mohammed Ali's 1831 invasion and occupation of 
Ottoman Palestine and Syria, intervention by Eur?pean powers led to 
Egyptian withdrawal and a determination in 1841 of a line running from 
Rafah to Suez as a limit to Egyptian authority. 
The political and economic importance of the area increased with 
the development of the Suez Canal in 1869. Britain intervened 
militarily in Egypt in 1882. The British goal of using the Sinai as a 
buffer for the Canal led in 1906 to forced Ottoman recognition of the 
Rafah-Aqaba line as the administrative boundary between Egypt and 
Ottoman Palestine. Following World War I, both sides of the boundary 
came under British control by the League of Nations awarding of the 
Palestine Mandate to Britain. 
The impor~ance of the boundary was enhanced by the hostilities 
incident upon the establishment of an independent Israel in 1948. The 
location of the boundary essentially survived the wars of 1948, 1956, 
1967, and 1973. Following the demarche of the Egyptian Government in 
1977 and the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979, 
the two states turned to the re-demarcation of the 1906 line and to the 
~ 
resolution of disputes. Today the line of 1906, the oldest in the 
modern Middle East, serves as Israel's only mutually recognized 
international boundary. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
Throughout the last two centuries, territorial disputes and 
boundary-related issues have been a major factor in conflicts between 
states. Frontiers, as an integral part of territorial sovereignty, play 
a crucial role in the life of nations; keeping their integrity is one of 
the most important conditions for the existence of the state, and 
usually events along the state's frontier area will affect the behavior 
of the w~ole country. Since the rise of nation-states in the 17th 
century, powerful neighbors have tended to expand and claim the 
territories of weaker ones, and it is commonly believed that boundary 
disputes will never disappear. 
The concept of boundaries evolved after the collapse of the Holy 
Roman Empire in Europe which was followed by the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648 and the emergence of modern Western European states. Boundary 
lines were still alien terms for nomadic societies of the Middle East at 
the beginning of the 20th century. These societies were characterized 
by frequent movement, and their territories could expand and narrow to 
accomodate transhumance. Middle Eastern tribes maintained real 
territorial independence by temporal separation or the creation of "no 
man's lands" between them. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the 
last few decades all throughout the Middle East territorial disputes 
have been a direct motive behind conflicts between states. As of 1992 
there is still no single Middle Eastern country which has no territorial 
claims or disputes with at least one of its neighbors. Although many of 
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the disputes are inactive, the unresolved ones can cause the eruption of· 
conflicts and major wars which may threaten the fragile stability of the 
region, e.g., in Kuwait during 1990. 
The weakening of the Ottoman Empire throughout the 19th century 
until its collapse in the beginning of the 20th century led to new 
territorial arrangements in the Middle East between the victorious 
European powers in the First World War. Britain and France exercised 
direct and indirect control over most of the area. These colonial 
powers considered their own interests and placed less weight on 
geographical and hwnan factors when they partitioned the area and drew 
the boundaries between the new states. The superimposed boundaries were 
mostly straight lines through the sand which cut through tribes and 
peoples who generally share homogenity and the same historical 
background and inspiration of unity, e.g. Kurds were split among Turkey, 
Iraq, Syria and Iran. Furthermore, the fact that most of the Middle 
East is desert area and border lines cross these areas adds yet another 
difficulty in keeping boundaries undisputed. Nothing is permanent in 
the desert; landforms change through time with the weathering effects of 
climate (e.g., shifting sand dunes) and there is no permanently settled 
population in many areas to mark boundary changes. Most of the boundary 
lines which were allocated and delimited by the colonial powers were 
never demarcated. This important stage was left to the successor 
states. 
By the end of the 19th century the British Empire, the greatest 
power on the seas, was a major European country facing the declining 
Ottoman Empire and playing a major role in the Levant, in Egypt, and 
3 
elsewhere. In this period many political boundaries were drawn by the 
British and other European powers around the world, especially in Africa 
and Asia. British policy-makers based their experience on elaborate 
concepts and rules regarding boundary lines. 
George Nathaniel Curzon, Lord Curzon of Kedleston, held many 
positions in the British foreign and colonial offices, served as viceroy 
in India and was involved in many boundary commissions. In 1907 Curzon 
gave a lecture at Oxford University titled "Frontiers." From his 
lecture, which was delivered one year after the 1906 British-Ottoman 
crisis over the eastern frontier of Egypt, we can learn much about the 
principles of boundary-drawing in the minds of British policy-makers. 
These principles were behind the British position in the British-
Ottoman confrontation of 1906 (see Chapter 4). Lord Curzon and others 
highly valued the desert of Sinai as a natural ba~rier; it is more 
impassible than the sea and "has retained a physical identity almost 
unequalled in history" (Curzon, 1907, p. 15). 
To support his point, Lord Curzon cited Napolean's Commentaries. 
"The greatest captain of modern times" wrote: 
Generals who have marched from Egypt to Syria or from Syria 
to Egypt have in all periods of history considered this 
desert the greater obstacle the larger the number of horses 
they took with them .... This obstacle, however, was not 
so great in ancient times as it is to-day, since towns and 
villages existed, and the industry of man contended with 
success against the difficulties. To-day scarcely anything 
remains between Salihiyeh and Gaza. An army must, 
therefore, cross the desert successively by forming 
establishments and magazines at Salihiyeh, Katieh, and El 
Arish. If this army starts from Syria it must first of all 
form a large magazine at El Arish, and then carry it forward 
to Katieh. But these operations are slow, and they give an 
enemy time to make his preparations for defense .... An 
army defending Egypt can either assemble at El Arish to 
oppose the investment of this place, or at Katieh to raise 
the siege of El Arish, or at Salihiyeh: all these 
alternatives offer advantages. Of all obstacles which may 
cover the frontiers of empires, a desert like this is 
incontesably the greatest. Mountains like the Alps take 
second rank, and rivers the third. If there is so much 
difficulty in carrying the food of an army that complete 
success is rarely obtained, this difficulty becomes twenty 
times greater when it is necessary to carry water, forage, 
and fuel, three things which are weighty, difficult to 
carry, and usually found by armies upon the ground they 
occupy. (Curzon, 1907, p. 16) 
_The British, having interests in India and Southeast Asia, 
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wanted to continue their control over the Suez Canal, the lifeline of 
their empire, and the area adjacent to it (see Chapter 3, ,,·Imperial 
interests ... "). The boundary line they imposed was extended about 120 
miles east of the Suez Canal to include the Sinai peninsula in order to 
se~e as a buffer zone between the Canal and the Ottoman provinces of 
Syria and Al-Hijaz. After several attempts to prevent this, the 
Ottomans were forced in October 1906 to demarcate the boundary line 
which extended from Rafah to Aqaba (see Chapter 4). After World War I 
the League of Nations confirmed a British Mandate over Palestine. From 
that time until 1948, Great Britain controlled both sides of the 
boundary line, minimizing its importance. The entrance of a new factor 
to the area, represented by the World Zionist Movement and later by the 
creation of the State of Israel in 1948, renewed the importance of the 
boundary. 
While there were several attempts to question the legality of the 
1906 line and to change it after its demarcation, it remained untouched 
until 1948. After Israel's establishment and the several wars between 
Israel and Egypt which followed, the boundary line passed through 
various changes. 
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The importance of the boundary of 1906 between Egypt and Israel 
rests on the facts that it is the oldest one in the region, that is the 
political boundary between two continents, and that is virtually the 
only mutually recognized international boundary Israel has with its Arab 
neighbors. The process of its creation started out as a "separate 
administrative line" in 1906 and ended as a de-jure boundary between 
neighboring countries after the Peace Treaty of 1979. 
This thesis will explore the boundary line since its inception in 
1841 up until 1992, how it was demarcated between the Ottoman and 
British empires in 1906, what factores were behind the demarcation of 
1906 and·the changes made since that time, and how the functions of the 
boundary line have changed over the years. The study area will include 
the Sin~i Peninsula, from the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Suez, in the 
west to southern Israel, from Ashqelon on the Mediterranean Sea to the 
southern point of the Dead Sea, including the Gaza Strip, in the east. 
This research will not attempt to cover maritime boundaries. 
Placenames are rendered in English according to the usage of the 
1970 Second (English) Edition of the Atlas of Israel. This is the sole 
atlas or gazeteer published in English by any Middle Eastern country. 
Use of this source was the product of some unfortunate Hebraicization of 
Arabic placenames. However, there does exist some variation in Arabic 
transliterations (reflecting regional usage), and the Atlas has become 
an important source for English-speaking cartographers (John Bartholomew 
& Son, 1985). Variation between the Hebrew and Arabic is not as serious 
in this edition of The Atlas as in other Israeli sources. In the few 
instances where places are not listed in this source, usage follows that 
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of the Rand McNally Illustrated Atlas of the Middle East. The gazeteers 
published by the United States Board on Geographic Names (The National 
Gazeteers of the United States of America Documents/Maps, 1990) are used 
as guides to which names are most usefully rendered conventionally, 
rather than transliterated (e.g., Jerusalem, rather than Al Quds or 
Yerushlayim). Unfortunately for purposes here, these gazeteers 
transliterate differently in different state-based volumes (e.g., 
"shaykh" and "sheikh") and the use of their listings would be confusing 
here where the controlling state changes. 
The maps presented here serve as accompaniments and illustrations 
for the text. They are much simplified and are not intended for general 
purposes. In specific instances they generalize or approximate actual 
geographic features, where such treatment is appropriate to the text and 
does not substantially distort depiction. Scale is approximate. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE SINAI PENINSULA 
The Physical Geography of Sinai 
The Sinai peninsula is triangular in shape, lying between the 
latitudes of 27° 30. N and 31° 30. N between the continents of Africa 
and Asia. While the Mediterranean Sea forms a base of the triangle in 
the north, Ras Muhammad composes its peak in the south. The Sinai 
peninsula is bordered by the Gulf of Aqaba in the east and the Gulf of 
Suez in the west. Both of them are connected with the Red Sea in the 
south (se·e Figure 1). The peninsula expands to cover an area of over 
60,000 km2 • From north to south it spans a distance of 400 km from 
Rafah on the Mediterranean Sea to Ras Muhammad on the Red Sea coast; 
from east to west it spans a distance of 190 km from Rafah to Qantara 
(Efrat & Orni, 1973. p. 125). 
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The peninsula is divided into three main regions according to 
elevation. The southern portion is mountainous and mostly conposed of 
crystalline rocks. This area rises to an elevation of 2,000 m and 
within it lies the highest point in Sinai, Jabal Kathrina, at 2,637 m 
(7,911 ft). On one of its slopes is situated the famous St. Catherine 
Monastery. Not far from that, Moses's Mountain rises to 2,285 m (6,855 
ft), which is considered to be the Mount Sinai where Moses received the 
Ten Commandments. The central part of Sinai is called the At-Tih 
plateau and forms 60% of the total area of the Sinai peninsula. It 
rises between 400-1,000 m, with a few cases in which there are mountains 
which exceed this height. The plateau is mainly composed of limestone 
Mediterranean Sea 
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Figure 1. Climax Vegetation of Sinai and Adjacent Area. 
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and dolomite. The third portion of the peninsula contains the northern 
plain and is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea. Although some hills and 
mountains rise in this region, it is basically flat with two major hill 
chains crossing the area from northeast to southwest making 
communication from east to west difficult. The topograghic obstacles 
give the passes of Gidi and Mitla (see Figure 2) in the southern edges 
of the plain a strategic advantage (see Chapter 7). The northernmost 
20-39 km of the Sinai Mediterranean coast is made up of sand dunes which 
extend a distance of 230 km east to west (Efrat & Orni, 1973, pp. 123-
131). 
Climatologically, the Sinai peninsula lies within the subtropical 
desert zone which extends from the western edges of the Sahara desert to 
the eastern fringes of the Arabian peninsula. The climate is hot and 
arid, precipitation being very scarce. Temperatu~es often peak at 35° C 
(95° F) in the summer. The summer nights are cold and temperature drops 
to 15° C (59° F), making a range of 20° C (36° F) which is very typical 
of desert conditions. Mean annual precipitation is less than four 
inches and 50% of Sinai receives less than two inches. The desert is 
generally barren except for a few shrubs and grasses which support 
nomadic grasses (Atlas of the Middle East, 1979, pp. 19-21). 
The harsh climate of the desert can explain the sparse population 
distribution. The population of Sinai is concentrated around very 
limited suitable land for agriculture, mainly around the town of El-
Arish and on the banks of the El-Arish valley in the northeastern 
portion of Sinai. Throughout most historical periods, the population of 
Sinai was mainly nomadic and semi-nomadic. By 1917 only 5,430 
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inhabitants lived in Sinai. The Egyptian Government estimated that 
prior to the the Six Days War, 130,000 persons lived in Sinai, the 
majority of them in the northern part of the peninsula. According to an 
Israeli census conducted in the end of 1967, only 33,441 persons lived 
in northern Sinai and few thousand others in the rest of the peninsula 
(Efrat & Orni, 1973, p. 381). 
Prior to the 1946 discovery of oil.in Sinai, mineral resources were 
considered very limited. Among the minerals which were later exploited 
by the Egyptians and the Israelis, between 1967-1978, were maganese, 
copper, iron, gypsum, and glass sands. Oil was discovered near the town 
of Suez alongside the Gulf of Suez in 1946. Today the major wells of 
Sinai are in Ras es-Sudar and Abu Rudeis (see Figure 2). Israel drilled 
more wells during the early 1970s. Egypt demanded and received the oil 
fields in the Second Disengagement Agreement of 1975 (see Chapter 7). 
Although the road network is presently not well developed, 
throughout history the Sinai peninsula served as a gateway from east to 
west between Egypt on one side and Arabia. and the Levant on the other. 
The well-known ancient roads were the Sea Road in the north section of 
Sinai which connected the Nile civilization with Mesopotamia via Qantara 
and El-Arish (see Figure 2). The second road is Shur, which today 
extends between Nizzana (called Auja before 1953) and Ismailiya on the 
west bank of the Suez Canal. One theory stated that. this route was used 
by Moses and the Israelites in their exodus from Egypt (Efrat & Orni, 
1973, p. 369). The third road is Darb El-Haj or the famous Pilgrims' 
Road. It extends from Suez via the Mitla pass to en Nahl and Aqaba. 
Prior to the operation of the Suez Canal, Egyptian and North African 
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· pilgrims used this route to the.holy places in Mecca and Medina. 
Moreover, it was used by the Ottoman Turks during their 1915 assault on 
the Suez Canal Zone and also by the Israeli military during the 1956 and 
1967 wars. The length of the pilgrims route within Sinai is 240 km 
(Efrat & Orni, 1973, p. 370). Today, the major routes in the Sinai 
peninsula crossing from north to south are from Elat to Sharm esh Sheikh 
along the eastern edges of Sinai and from Port Said to Sharm esh Sheikh 
in the west. The Egyptian Government heavily invested in the Sinai road 
network and there is a plan to connect Sinai with the Saudi Arabian 
coast via the Straits of Tiran (Shezif, 1992, pp. 18-19). 
The Historical Geography of Sinai 
The human history of the Sinai peninsula is very old, dated back 
to the kingdoms of ancient Egypt in the third and fourth millenia before 
the common era (B.C.E.). This area served as a crossroads between 
civilizations, mainly be.tween the Nile Valley and Mesopotamia. The 
Hyksos invaded Egypt through Sinai around 1670. The founders of the New 
Kingdom of Egypt expelled the Hyksos around 1570 and in turn drove 
across the Sinai and conquered Palestine by 1460 Mount Sinai in the 
peninsula is known as the place in which Moses received the Ten 
Commandments, and the Sinai desert was the wilderness in which Moses led 
the Israelite tribe after they were freed from Egyptian captivity. 
The armies of other kingdoms and dynasties throughout the first 
millenium crossed Sinai to conquer Egypt. This was the case with the 
Assyrians in 668. The Persian Cambyses followed in 526. Between the 
years 333-323, Alexander the Great marked the birth of the Hellenistic 
period in Egypt. Later, the Romans and Byzantines conquered Egypt 
respectively. The famous Santa Catherine Monastery was built in the 
Byzantine era. The former Byzantine domain over Egypt ended in the 
seventh century when Muslim leader Amr ibn El-As crossed Sinai and 
advanced into Egypt in 640 C.E. Several Muslim dynasties ruled Egypt 
after that, including the Umayyed and Abbasid Caliphates (640-969). 
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They were followed by the Fatimid from 969-1171, the Ayyubid from 1171-
1250, and the Mamluks from 1250-1517 (Haddad & Nijim, 1989, pp. 145-
147). Given the period covered in this essay, Ritter's classic 1866 
work remains an useful general reference to the ancient geography of the 
area (Ritter, 1968). 
The Ottoman Administrative Division of Egypt and the Levant 
In 1515 the Turkish military, led by Selim I,, advanced into Syria 
and Palestine, occupying the area in 1515 and 1516. They crossed the 
Sinai peninsula and conquered Egypt, defeating the Mamluks in 1517. 
Generally speaking, the Ottomans did not disturb the political 
arrangements and ethnic composition of the conquered territories; 
moreover, they did not settle in large numbers within the new 
territories annexed to their Anatolian base and forming the Ottoman 
Empire. 
The administrative division of the Ottoman Empire followed the 
patttern set down by the Mamluks. It was divided into vilayets or 
provinces. The vilayets were subdivided into administrative units 
called sanjaks or liva, meaning districts, which were further subdivided 
into kada or counties. There were 26 vilayets in the Ottoman Empire, 
14 
five of them in Egypt. The newly occupied territories were governed by 
an Ottoman viceroy who was sent from Istanbul by the Ottoman Government. 
While the Ottomans called the governor Vali, the Egyptians called him 
Pasha. The Vali was in charge of managing the financial, religious, and 
military activities in his own vilayet. In other areas, the government 
remained in the hands on Mamluk Beys, under the Vali's supervision. 
From the natives the Ottomans demanded loyalty and payment of taxes 
(Efendi, 1966. p. 4). The title of Vali was distinguished by a Tug, or 
horse tail. The Sultan of Istanbul had six horse tails, the Valis had 
three, and the Sanjakbeys had only one tail (Stanford, 1962, p.· 9). 
By the end of the 19th century, Egypt was divided into 24 sanjaks, 
most of them concentrated along the Nile River. Only one sanjak 
(Salihiyeh) was in the Sinai peninsula (Efendi, 1966; pp. 36-37; see 
Figure 3). Palestine, which at that time was called Southern Syria, was 
not an administrative division. It was split between the Vilayet of 
Beirut (the northern section) and the Vilayet of Syria. During the 
1870s the importance of the holy places in Jerusalem led the Ottomans to 
form a new Sanjak of Jerusalem, which was under the direct control of 
the Sultan of Istanbul. Another sanj ak formed was the Sanj ak of 
Lebanon. It was established after the massacre of the Maronite 
community by the Druze in 1860. In the 1870s, Syria was divided into 
three villayets: Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo; Mesopotamia was also 
divided into three: Basra, Bagdad, and Mosul (Baylson, 1987, pp. 63-
65). 
Unlike other tributary states and provinces in the Ottoman Empire, 
Egypt was only loosely Connected to the Ottoman central government. 
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This situation continued until World War I. The Ottomans were 
challenged as early as the 17th century by the Mamluks, a people of 
Circassian origin and the decendents of military "slaves" who had been 
brought to Egypt since the Middle Ages and had ruled Egypt until 1517 
(Weigall, 1915, p. 52). Although Egypt continued to pay annual taxes to 
the Sultan of Istanbul, it was under the Mamluks' practical control. 
The situation did not bother the Ottomans as long as Egypt paid revenues 
and participated in the Ottoman army. Holt (1966) provides useful 
chronologicies and geneologies for the period 1516-1922. 
Egypt During the 18th Century 
In 1798 Napolean Bonaparte initiated a military campaign to conquer 
Egypt. His goal was to interrupt the British communication links to 
India. After completing his occupation of Egypt, he advanced into 
Palestine. He crossed Sinai and reached Sidon in southern Lebanon. 
Napolean's campaign failed to gain any political advantages for France. 
However, the British perceived Napolean as a serious threat to their 
imperial interests. They were determined to expel the French from 
Egypt. By 1801 the British occupied Egypt and in 1802 they expelled the 
French and restored the Mamluk governor to power (Lenczowski, 1980, p. 
34). 
Mohammed Ali, an Albanian of strong personality, was an officer 
sent by the Ottomans to Egypt to fight the French. When the French and 
the British left the country in 1803, he defeated all local competing 
factions, including the Mamluks, and became viceroy in 1805. Ali 
strengthed his rule and introduced a new policy of openness towards 
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Europe. He had friendly relations with the French who trained and 
equipped his army. By the 1820s, Ali's army was strong enough to carry 
out several military campaigns against the Wahhabis, Greeks, and 
Sudanese, and finally to stage an uprising against his suzerian, the 
Sultan of Istanbul (Perets, 1962, pp. 191-192). The intervention of 
Britain and other European countries against Mohammed Ali's expansion in 
1840 forced him to evacuate Greater Syria, a territory he had occupied 
in 1831-1832. 
The power vacuum left by Ali in Greater Syria and the political 
circumstances in the Ottoman Empire enhanced British power in the area. 
Increasingly since their gradual domination of India, the main goal of 
the British Government was the protection of the trade routes between 
·.Europe and India and the maintenance of a complete British naval 
monopoly in the Indian Ocean. This was true before the creation of the 
Suez Canal and .after. Before, Britain- moved to secure two land routes 
to India. The first was by sea to Alexandria and over land to Suez, 
then by water from the Red Sea to the. Indian Ocean. Britain planned as 
early as 1839 to construct a railway from Alexandria to Suez via Cairo, 
but it failed to carry the plan out until the 1850s for local reasons. 
The second route was via the northern section of the Syrian desert along 
the Euphrates and then to the Persian Gulf. Durin& the 19th century, 
Great Britain occupied several strategic places along the route to India 
and signed various ag~eements with several countries. In 1814 Britain 
made a defensive alliance with Persia. Earlier it guaranteed control 
over Malta in 1803·and the Ionian Islands in 1809. It signed a treaty 
with·the Trucial States in 1820 .. The acquisition of Aden in 1839 
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followed (Baylson, 1987, p. 48). The creation of the Suez Canal in 1869 
enhanced the importance of Egypt and the areas adjacent. In 1878 
Britain moved to occupy Cyprus (see Figure 3). Then four years later it 
occupied Egypt itself. Britain controlled the new sea route to India 
and needed to establish the boundaries of the territory of Egypt in 
which it ruled. Britain demanded a clear demarcation between Egypt and 
Ottoman territory through the Sinai. 
The Importance of the Boundary and Related Studies 
The Egypt-Sinai boundary is of special interest for many scholars. 
Geographers, lawyers, historians, and political scientists have 
contributed to its study. The number and diversity of the writers 
indicates not only the importance of the boundary but the different 
countries involved. While geographers are intere~ted in the 1906 line 
as an element affecting the cultural landscape, lawyers are interested 
in the determination of the limit of the judicial system and the 
sovereignty of the states adjacent to the boundary line. Historians 
have analyzed the boundary changes though different periods, and 
political scientists are interested in the administration of the state 
in the frontier as well as in the core or the center. 
The importance of the boundary line between Egypt and Palestine, 
and between Egypt and Israel since 1948, is derived first and foremost 
from its location. This boundary forms the limit of the political 
boundary between the African and Asian continents. An obvious question 
is, if the Suez Canal had not been created in the 1870s, whether the 
continental boundary would be located farther east, e.g., at the Isthmus 
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of Suez, which seems more natural. A second factor making the boundary 
important is that it is the oldest modern boundary in the Middle East. 
Although the boundary has changed for brief periods with opposing armies 
crossing it several times, it has remained permanent since its 
delimitation in 1906. 
Moreover, the Egypt-Palestine boundary became an international 
boundary without any signed agreements between the states involved. The 
boundary was imposed by the British on the Ottoman Empire. It was an 
administrative line until 1915 when Great Britain unilaterally declared 
the secession of Egypt from the Ottoman Empire. The Egypt-Israel line 
became a mutually recognized international boundary de-jure for the 
first time in 1978 when the two countries, represented by their leaders 
President Anwar Al-Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of 
Israel, signed the Camp David Agreement under the,auspices of the Carter 
Administration. The fact that the Egypt-Israel boundary line is the 
only international boundary between Israel and the neighboring Arab 
countries adds further weight to its significance. Israel still has 
cease-fire, disengagement and armistice lines with Jordan, Syria, and 
Lebanon, respectively. 
Literature and resources regarding the boundary line and its 
development are available, especially in English, Arabic, and Hebrew. 
The English literature is written mostly by scholars as academic 
research. One of the most remarkable sources is Palestine Boundaries 
1833-1947 edited by P. Toye (1989). This documentary reference is a 
detailed account of the political activities related to the boundary 
issue conducted between London and Cairo on one hand, and Istanbul on 
the other. Lord Cramer's book Modern Egypt (1908) contains detailed 
memoirs of the British Governor of Egypt during his service there. 
Other research in English is largely academic and objective, but is 
limited in scope and to particular periods. 
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Much of the Israeli and Zionist literature regarding the boundary 
issue is tendentious. As one might expect, Israeli writers are affected 
by their national or ethnic interests. Due to the fact that all of the 
1948 Israeli boundaries were officially temporary, many Israelis believe 
that the Jewish State's boundary problem is part of the issue of its 
very existence. This has made Israeli literature less objective. Moshe 
Brawer, a leading Israeli expert on the boundary issue, argues in his 
book Erets-Israel Boundaries, Past, Present and Future, that·Israeli 
officials, in the redemarcation of the boundary in 1982, showed 
ignorance and negligence. He described the arrangement as a new major 
error (1982, p. 7). More typically, Martin Gilbert, who published Atlas 
of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (1974), describes the boundary conflict 
from a Zionist perspective as a series of Arab penetrations and attacks 
on Jewish settlement in Palestine (p. 40). 
Egyptians generally do not believe the existence of Egypt depends 
on its exact boundaries or its neighbor's recognition. But similar 
problems do appear. Treatment often involves emotions and lack of 
objectivity. Mahmood El-Deeb, in his book Palestine Boundaries (1979), 
claims that the eastern Egyptian boundary runs from Rafah to Aqaba. He 
extends the boundary to include the east coast of the Gulf of Aqaba and 
farther south in Saudi Arabian territories (p. 114). Unlike other 
scholars, he derives this boundary according to the Ottoma Firman of 
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1841, recognizing Mohammed Ali's relative independence. Moreover, the 
Taha Conflict and the other disputed points along the boundary became 
for the Egyptian writers a "national issue." This is true for example 
in Abdel Hai's book Taha (1991) and Rizik's Taha, the Generation Problem 
(1989). The amount of literature regarding the Taha Arbitration exceeds 
the literature otherwise written about the boundary since its 
establishment. Unfortunately, the peace treaty of 1979 between Egypt 
and Israel, and the re-demarcation of the boundary, did not make the 
literature less emotional or more objective. 
Rushdi Merlo Pasha, the Turkish officer stationed at Aqaba during 
the Crisis of 1906, wrote a memior on the crisis titled Aqaba Affair 
(1910). He stated that the conflict with Britain was not over a few 
miles around Taha, but rather over the entire area of Palestine (p. 20). 
Similar problems for Israelis and Egyptians appear in current 
literature. 
Generally, the wealth of literature does not cover the whole story 
of·the Egypt-Palestine/Israel boundary. Not only is it limited in scope 
and by time period, but also in objectivity and fairness. Much 
theoretical and comparative literature exists-geographic, legal, 
historical, philosophical, etc. about the nature and purposes of 
boundaries. Glassner and de Blig (1989, pp. 134-153) provide an 
intitial bibliography from the geographic perspective. To treat and 
apply this literature to the Egypt-Palestine/Israel boundary will likely 
be focus for future work. The purpose of this essay is to provide a 
continuous descriptive account of the Egypt-Palestine/Israel boundary 
from 1841 to the present. The development of the boundary line and 
changes in its functions are considered. 
22 
23 
CHAPTER 3 
THE EGYPT-OTTOMAN BOUNDARY BEFORE 1906 
Imperial Interests in the Middle East Before the 1906 Incident 
The European powers' interests in the Middle East were connected 
with routes for shipping and trade with the Far East. The competition 
between Great Britain and France over India in the 18th century elevated 
the overall importance of the Middle East, especially Egypt. Even 
before the creation of the Suez Canal, Egyptian territories were 
important for European powers as a route for trade with India and the 
Far East via Suez and the Red Sea. For the British, this route saved 
4,500 miles or three months on the voyage from London to Calcutta; while 
the other route took five months via the Atlantic and Indian Oceans 
around the Cape, it took just two months via Egypt (Drysdale & Blake, 
1985, p. 51). 
France had played a major role in Egypt since the occupation staged 
by Napolean in 1798. France had a strong relationship with Mohammed 
Ali, ruler of Egypt 1805-1848. In 1840, France, which trained and 
equipped Mohammed Ali's army, was the only European power which failed 
to rush support to the Ottoman Sultan when Ali's army threatened his 
overthrow. The rivalry over Egypt between France and Great Britain 
accelerated after the creation of the Suez Canal. While the major 
investor in the canal, France, had received the concession to build it 
in 1854, Britain was the major user and benefactor after 1869. The 
status of Egypt was drastically altered after the British moved in and 
took control over the Canal Zone. Since it was their lifeline to India, 
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the British were very careful in their administration so as not to 
arouse the hostility of the populace and thereby avoid any troubles 
which would threaten their general interests. The French earlier held 
influence over Egyptian affairs, but after British domination, Egypt 
became a vital link in Indian trade. The Anglo-French rivalry over the 
status of Egypt marked the two European powers' relations for more than 
a century and finally ended in 1904 when the two countries settled this 
divisive colonial conflict in the Entene Cordiale of April 1904. 
According to the agreement, France gave up in her quest for Egypt and 
accepted the de facto British occupation; in return, Great Britain 
accepted French dominance over Morroco (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, p. 51). 
Another factor which complicated the geopolitics of the Middle East 
in the late 19th century and the early years of the 20th century was the 
rise of a unified Germany. The German Empire shared a close 
relationship with the Ottomans. Their economic activitities were 
enhanced when in 1893 the Ottoman Sultan granted a concession to a 
German company to build a railway from Istanbul to the Persian Gulf 
through Baghdad (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, p. 55). German economic and 
military aid to the Ottomans strengthened the diplomatic relationship 
between the two countries. According to Warburg, the German ambassador 
in Istanbulwas behind the suggestion of the omission of Sinai from an· 
1892 investiture firman of the Khedive 1 (Warburg, 1979, p. 681). The 
German strategy under Bismark was to play off the British against the 
Ottomans so as not to give the British any strategic advantages in the 
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region, e.g. control over Sinai. Heyd. (1963) suggests that the British-
Ottoman crisis of 1906 was part of the Anglo-German competition over 
economic interests and hegemony in the Ottoman Empire (p. 201). 
The concession which was given to the German company upset the 
British who claimed hegemony over the Middle East and were concerned by 
the German advances in the region. One of the most important sections 
in the Istanbul-Gulf railway was the section which was planned by 
Germany to Basra and the Persian Gulf (see Figure 4). The competition 
over this section would give the Germans very important strategic access 
to the Persian Gulf which the British viewed as a threat to their route 
to India due to its geographic proximity. The British wanted to thwart 
any possible German intrusions into the region before they ever got off 
the ground. To foil the German plan, the British reached an agreeement 
with Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait. In response, the Ottomans and the 
Germans incited Ibn Rashead, the tribal leader of central Arabia, 
against the Kuwaiti sheikh. But Ibn Rashead and the Ottoman troops who 
rushed to join him were defeated in 1904 by Abid El-Aziz Bin Saud, who 
came to support the Kuwaiti sheikh. With this stunning success of a 
1Khedive or viceroy, a title of Persian origin given by the 
Ottoman Sultan to Ismail Pasha, the grandson of Mohammed Ali, in 1870. 
Ismail was not satisfied with being a nominal ruler and wanted the 
Sultan to greatly expand his authorities so he could make treaties and 
establish diplomatic relations with European powers. He requested to be 
called Aziz or Almighty. The Sultan refused and gave him the title of 
Khedive, which is less pretentious than Aziz (Weigall, 1915, p. 91). 
The title was used by other Egyptian rulers until 1914. 
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British foreign policy initiative in the region, the strategic Persian 
Gulf coastal area of Kuwait fell under British control and influence, 
thereby thwarting German ambitions and ending plans for the railway 
(Heyd, 1963, p. 202). 
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The fate of the Damascus-Al-Hijaz railway proposals was similar 
(see Figure 4). The Sultan had hoped that the construction of the 
railway would improve his position in the Islamic world and ease the 
burden of pilgrims to Mecca. The project started in 1900 and by the end 
of 1904 it reached a point, just 100 km east of Aqaba. The Ottomans 
planned to link Aqaba with the project, which would free them from 
reliance ·upon the British-controlled Suez Canal. The British foreign 
office was very concerned with the possibility of the Ottomans 
constructing a branch to Aqaba. According to the British command in 
Egypt, such a project would threaten the sea route to India and the Far 
East and enhance Egyptian vulnerability (Khalidi, 1980, p. 21). 
The Ottomans, who perceived the British occupation of Egypt as only 
temporary and the delimitation of an El-Arish-Aqaba line as only an 
administrative one, did not abandon their claims over Egypt. A possible 
confrontation with the British over Sinai would enhance the Sultan's 
position in the minds of the Egyptian population. Moreover, the 
political situation in Egypt was extremely volatile. The nationalist 
movement in Egypt led by Mustafa Kamil El-Rifai was very powerful and 
supported the Sultan against the British. The victory of Japan over 
~-
Russia in 1904-05 increased the confidence of the Egyptian population in 
confronting a European power (Warburg, 1979, p. 692). 
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The Egypt-Ottoman Rivalry over the .Eastern Egyptian Frontier 
Since the occupation of Egypt and Syria by the Ottoman Turks, the 
Sinai peninsula had been the administrative ·boundary between the 
province of Egypt and the province of Syria (see Figure 3). The Sinai, 
a harsh desert sparsely populated by Bedouin tribes, captured little 
Ottoman administrative attention. While the provinces of Egypt and 
Syria paid annual taxes to the Sultan in Istanbul, the Bedouin tribes 
received an annual sum of money for allowing Islamic pilgrims to pass 
safely through the desert to Mecca and Medina with their protection 
(Stanford, 1962, p. 27). 
The eastern Egyptian frontier took shape for the first time after 
the occupation of Syria by the forces of Ibrahim Pasha during the 1830s. 
Ibrahim Pasha, general and son of Mohammed Ali who led an earlier 
Egyptian revolt against the Ottomans, was threatening the Sultan's 
overthrow. By 1833 he reached as close as 100 km to Istanbul, and for 
the following eight years (1833-1841) Egyptian forces exercised control 
over the area from the Nile Valley to the Taurus Mountains in. southern 
Auatolia (Biger, 1978, p. 323). 
In 1840, the European powers of Austria-Hungary, Prussia, Russia 
and Great Britain intervened to protect the Ottoman throne and halt 
Ali's ambitions. They regarded him as a threat to the peace of Europe 
in general and their overseas interests in particular. As a result, 
Ali's troops were forced to vacate their occupied Ottoman territories. 
In compensation, Sultan Mahmud II with consent of the European powers, 
issued an imperial edict .(firman) to Mohammed Ali allowing him and his 
heirs control of Egypt (Hurewitz, 1989, p.· xiv). 
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Egypt's effective independence had been recognized internationally 
in the 1840 Treaty of London (Vatikiotis, 1991; p. 59). The Firman of 
1841 recognized Egypt's status and regularized it within the Ottoman 
Empire. Thus, the Firman of 1841 and later firmans (e.g., 1866, 1869, 
1872, 1873, and 1892) had quasi-constitutional status for Egypt 
(Vatikiotis, 1991, p. 60). They recognized or regularized the Egyptian 
succession, form of government, treaty and borrowing powers, etc. The 
Firman of 1892 will be seen to be especially important in the Egyptian-
Palestine boundary. 
Contained in the firman was a map showing the extent of control for 
Ali and his successors. This was the first map to indicate the eastern 
frontier in the formation of a sovereign Egypt (see Figure 5). 
According to the accompanying map, the .boundary ran from a point just 
east of Rafah (between Rafah and Khan Yunis) on the Mediterranean to 
Suez, giving Egypt contol over only the northwest portion of the Sanai 
peninsula (Hurewitz, 1989, p. xiv). There is a widely held belief that 
the only two copies of the 1841 map were lost forever (Biger, 1978, p. 
325; Mitwali, 1989, p. 11). The map deprived Egypt of the rest of Sinai 
and of Al-Muwaylih, Ziba and Al-Wajh, areas along the east coast of the 
Gulf of Aqaba in the pilgrimage route to Mecca. These areas had been 
garrisoned by Egyptian troops to protect the pilgrimage routes before 
the Firman of 1841 (Mitwali, 1989, p. 46; see Figure 3). Ali and his 
successor, who did not accept the new line, continued to control these 
forts along the pilgrims• route for several decades. 
The importance of Egypt and its eastern frontier escalated during 
the 1850s and 1860s, accompanied with an increasing rivalry between 
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France and Great Britain over Egypt. While the British sponsored the 
building of railroads between Alexandria to Suez through Cairo, French 
engineers planned to create a canal between the Mediterranean and the 
Red Sea for international shipping (Hurewitz, 1989, p. xii). In 1854, 
Ferdinand de Lesseps, a former French consul in Egypt, received 
permission from Egyptian Vali/Pasha Said to establish a company to 
finance the creation of the Suez Canal (Vatikiotis, 1991, pp 85-88). 
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During the 1870s the Egyptian economic situation became worse, 
arguably due to a combination of corruption, mismanagement, and bad 
investments in the canal and other projects. By 1876, the public debt 
had reached £94 million and Egyptian Treasury Bills were suspended. 
Britain purchased Egypt's shares in the canal. Egypt experienced severe 
financial distress, and during the year 1880, unrest in the Egyptian 
army led to a popular uprising, and Egypt was threatened with a state of 
anarchy (Chirol, 1921, p. 38). 
The British were concerned about the future of the Suez Canal, 
since the shipping route was the lifeline of the British Empire. This 
became especially so after the revolt of Ahmad Urabi, the Egyptian 
nationalist officer who opposed the instrusion of foreign powers. 
Urabi, a member of a fellah peasant family, served at the Palace of 
Cairo in 1863. He was dismissed by Khedive Ismail for insurgent 
activities and became a leading figure in dissent against the Khedive 
and his policies. He utilized dissatisfaction among army.officers to 
his advantage and incited the officer corps against Khedive Ismail and 
then his son Khedive. Tawfiq. In 1882, Egypt was in a state of anarchy 
and Khedive Tawfiq fled to European protection in Alexandria. In an 
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attempt to resist the nationalist movement, the British sought to 
restore the Khedive's authority and to induce reforms (Mansfield, 1972, 
pp. 42-50). 
In 1882, Great Britain occupied Egypt. According to Lord Cromer 
(1908), the purpose for the occupation was to restore law and order and 
to balance the £gyptian budget. Urabi, who fought against the British, 
was defeated and deported from Egypt (p. 328). Great Britain, which 
soon controlled Egypt at all levels except.the lowest, came to face a 
growing nationalist movement opposing the occupation. In the late 1880s 
the situation in Egypt was far from Cromer's attitude that the Egyptian 
masses were "supposed to be, or at least ought to have been, grateful 
for British reforms" (Cromer, 1908, pp. 193-94). In the mind of Cromer, 
the British were there to save Egypt from utter chaos and the ruin of 
anarchy, and an uprising was not the proper way for the Egyptian 
populace to welcome their British saviors. 
The protection of the eastern frontier was one of Lord Cromer's top 
priorities because the British were afraid that the Ottomans might try 
to exploit the situation and intervene. During the crisis of 1841, 
Britain had supported the Ottoman Sultan in retracting the Egyptian 
frontier farther west from Syria because of French influence in Ali's 
Egypt. In 1882 the situation was reversed. Egypt had come under British 
occupation, and the British wished to push Egyptian territory farther 
east. 
In 1892, when Khedive Tawfiq died, Sultan Abdulhamid issued a 
Firman of Investiture for the enthronement of Khedive Abbas II Hilmi. 
The Firman failed to mention Sinai and the Egyptian forts on the eastern 
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coast of the Red Sea as being subject to the new Khedive (Kishtainy, 
1970, p. 17; Hurewitz, 1989, p. xiv). During the 1880s, the Ottomans 
occupied the Egyptian forts on the eastern coast of the Red Sea (see 
Figure 3). By this time, Egyptian and North African Muslim pilgrims had 
started to use the Suez Canal as a route to Mecca and no longer needed 
protection along the risky overland route. 
The Sultan in Istanbul, by his new firman of investiture, tried to 
restore his influence in Egypt, the most important province in the 
Ottoman Empire, because Egypt was the wealthiest territory in the 
region, bringing in the largest revenues and holding a strategic 
location on the pilrimage route to Mecca as well as for military 
purposes. He tried to turn the clock back to the line determined in the 
Firman of 1841. According to that boundary, the Ottomans controlled 3-
4 km along the southern end of the canal on the eastern bank (Brawer, 
1972, p.S). The Ottomans valued such a claim along the Suez Canal 
because they valued the maritime route for troop movements to guard the 
holy places in Mecca and Medina, and for better connection with their 
vassal states along the Red Sea coast and in the Gulf. 
Lord Cromer, who was carefully watching Ottoman activities 
regarding the eastern frontier, protested to Istanbul the omission of 
Sinai as a part of the Khedive's governorship. He delayed the ceremony 
of the enthronement of the new Khedive and demanded a new firman. The 
firman crisis was settled by the Grand Vizir (the Ottoman prime 
minister), who sent a telegram to the Khedive of Egypt recognizing his 
rule ov~r the Sinai peninsula, stating: "The status quo is maintained 
in the same manner as it was administered at the time of your 
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grandfather ... and of your father .. " (Toye, 1989, p. 59). Lord 
Cromer wrote to Tigrane Pasha, the Egyptian minister of foreign affairs, 
accepting the offer as "bounded to the east by a line running in a 
southeasterly direction from a point a short distance to the east of El-
Arish to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, just west of Aqaba itself" 
(Toye, 1989, p. 59)(see Figure 2). Cramer's letter was published in an 
official gazette and the Sultan did not formally take objection. In 
view of later developments, it is useful to note that Cramer's 
description uses El-Arish, rather than Rafah and Kan Yunis, to mark the 
northern terminus of the line. 
Meanwhile, the Ottomans annexed Aqaba and the Egyptian forts along 
the east coast of the Red Sea to the Vilayet of Al-Hijaz (Kishtainy, 
1970, p. 17). In his memiors, Cromer mentions he believes that the 
Sultan's uncertainty and suspicion regarding Je~ish settlement near 
Aqaba also underlay the crisis (1908, pp. 268-69). 
Although Egypt lost Aqaba and its forts along the pilgrimage route, 
for the first time it received Ottoman recognition of an eastern 
boundary which included the whole Sinai peninsula. The British were 
satisfied because they had achieved their strategic goal of keeping the 
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Sinai peninsula as a "natural" barrier for the defense of the Suez Canal 
(Hurewitz, 1989, p. xvii). This set the stage for the delimitation of 
the Egyptian-Ottoman boundary (Rizik, 1989, p. 46; Brawer, 1972, p. 5). 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EGYPT-OTTOMAN BOUNDARY, 1906-1918 
The Agaba Incident of 1906 
The 1892 description of the frontier between Egypt and the Ottoman 
provinces of Syria and Al-Hijaz stood for 14 years. During this period 
the Ottomans remained in silent disagreement with the British over two 
critical points regarding the frontier. First, the fact that the Sinai 
peninsula was part of the territory in which the Khedive exercised his 
control did not, according to the Ottoman position, make the area an 
integral part of Egypt. The Ottomans considered Sinai separate from the 
Egyptian privileged territories described in the investiture Firman of 
1892. Second, the tactical acceptance of the 1892 boundary line by the 
Sultan had never been formally recognized by the Ottoman government 
(Hurewitz, 1989, xii). 
The importance of the Egyptian eastern frontier brought Lord Cromer 
to assign Jennings Bramly as British frontier administration officer in 
Sinai. The Egyptian government allocated 5,000 Egyptian pounds in 1905 
for the development of Sinai (Mitwali, 1989, p. 71). Bramly arrived at 
en-Nahl 120 km east of the town of Suez, where he established his 
headquarters. Meanwhile, he headed to the frontier area and began 
constructing military outposts. Bramly negotiated with local Turkish 
officers over the exact location of the boundary: he claimed that 
Quseima, Kuntilla and the eastern area alongside the Aqaba-Gaza road 
were Egyptian territories (Kliot, 1987, p. 55; see Figure 6). 
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British activity in the frontier area upset Ottoman authorities in 
Istanbul. When some Egyptian newspapers opposed to the British 
occupation exaggerated reports of the frontier issues, the Ottomans 
initiated a response. The Ottoman authorities asked Egypt to withdraw 
troops from the frontier, and they ordered the Turkish officer in Aqaba 
to establish Ottoman military posts in Quseima and Kuntilla (Mitwali, 
1989, p. 72). In January 1906, Bramly and five Egyptian soldiers 
arrived at Umm-Rashrash (the site of the later Israeli Elat), five km 
west of Aqaba, and stationed themselves there awaiting additional orders 
(see Figure 7). Rushdi Pasha, the Turkish officer in Aqaba during the 
crisis, gave an account of the incident which followed in a detailed 
book published in 1910 titled Agaba Affair. In this book he reveals how 
he met with Bramly at Umm-Rashrash and ordered him to vacate the area 
because it belonged to the Ottoman Empire. He s~ggested trying to solve 
the problem between Cairo and Istanbul (p. 7). A few days later Bramly 
left Umm-Rashrash for Suez with a letter from the Turkish officer 
confirming that Urnrn-Rashrash belonged to the Ottoman administrative 
province of Al-Hijaz. 
With the absence of Bramly, Rushdi decided to establish a military 
post in Umm-Rashrash. His goal was to prevent further British expansion 
and to protect Wadi Araba (which extends from the southern end of the 
Dead Sea to Aqaha), especially after Bramly's claim that Wadi Araba 
belonged to Egypt (Rushdi, 1910, p. 20). A wadi is a "desert 
watercourse which is usually dry, and contains water only occasionally, 
after a heavy rainfall" (Moore, 1974, p. 236). The term is often used 
to refer to the entirety of the depre~sion (i.e. from ridge to ridge) 
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carried out by the watercourse. The wadi can be long enough (here from 
the Dead Sea to Aqaba), wide enough, and have ridges high enough to be 
important both in transportation and militarily. 
In addition to Umm Rashrash, Rushdi occupied Taba with Ottoman 
troops. Taba was then a small village located a few miles to the south 
of Umm-Rashrash on the Red Sea coast. The Egyptian government sent a 
military unit to verify the Ottoman occupation of Taba. Rushdi refused 
to speak with the Egyptian officer regarding the Ottoman presence at 
Taba. On January 22, 1906, an Egyptian naval vessel, Nur al-Bahr, 
arrived on the western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba near Taba. Rushdi, 
who had approximately 3,000 Ottoman troops stationed in the area, 
prepared forcefully to prevent the vessel from anchoring (Rushdi, 1910, 
p. 25). When the Egyptian soldiers tried to reach Taba by boat, the 
Ottomans threatened to open fire on them. The B~itish-Egyptian naval 
vessel had no choice but to anchor off Faroun Island, just two miles 
from Taba. There the British captain waited for new orders (see Figure 
7). 
Bramly was ordered back to the disputed area in an attempt to solve 
the problem. He questioned Sudqi Efendi, the Ottoman officer in Taba, 
regarding his prevention of Egyptian troops from landing in Taba. 
Bramly threatened, in case of the continuation of the situation, to 
bring additional vessels with more troops. Bramly met also with Rushdi 
Pasha, in overall Ottoman command at Aqaba, and demanded the right to 
anchor at Taba and to put 50 Egyptian troops ashore in Taba and Aqaba. 
Bramly's demands followed the order of the Khedive's government in 
Cairo. In response, Rushdi read the telegram he had received from 
Istanbul. He was ordered to use all measures necessary to prevent 
Egyptian troops from being stationed in Taba (Rushdi, 1910, p. 27). 
Meanwhile, the Egyptian troops stationed at Faroun Island awaited 
new orders. The British captain chose Faroun Island for several 
reasons: 
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1. The island, being only two miles from Taba and several miles 
from Aqaba, was a useful site for monitoring Ottoman troop movements in 
the area. 
2. The island was uninhabited. 
3. While the British had powerful naval forces, the Ottomans 
depended on infantry and had no naval vessels in the Gulf. 
4. The Ottomans had never claimed the island before and the island 
was not mentioned in the Firman of 1892 (Mitwali, 1989. p. 74). 
In the weeks that followed, diplomatic efforts alternated between 
Cairo and Istanbul. In the frontier area, both sides attempted to avoid 
a confrontation between Ottoman and British military. Bramly asked 
Rushdi to inform his government that London was interested in the 
demarcation of the boundary by a joint Ottoman-Egyptian commission. The 
Sultan in Istanbul postponed a response to Rushdi's telegram. 
Meanwhile, Bramly waited at Faroun Island for a reply from the Turkish 
officer. The simple reason for the delay was the unwillingness of 
Istanbul to demarcate a boundary because Egypt was considered to be at 
least in the Ottoman sphere of influence even if not a fully subject 
part of the Ottoman Empire. This situation increased the likelihood of 
a possible confrontation on the frontier. 
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The British, who were determined to restore Taba to Egypt and to 
demarcate the boundary, sent additional forces to the area. Another 
British naval vessel, the Diana, arrived at Farun Island. The British, 
who formerly had left formal negotiations to the Khedive and the Sultan, 
now officially asked the Sultan to withdraw Ottoman troops from Taha and 
to demarcate the boundary. The Sultan refused, stating that there was 
no argument over the boundary (Warburg, 1979, p. 680). With the arrival 
of the Diana, the number of British and Egyptian troops reached 700 
(Rushdi, 1910, p. 46). An angry Ottoman telegram sent to the Khedive on 
February 22, 1906, demanded the complete withdrawal of the vessels and 
the troops from the area. 
The British turned to active diplomacy backed by the threat of 
using force. The British embassy in Istanbul was the core of this 
activity. In addition, the British increased their military forces and 
naval vessels in Egypt. To convince the Ottomans of their 
determination, the British enhanced their naval presence in the 
Mediterranean Sea. After the British threat, the Ottomans softened 
their position. This attitude was obvious in the new orders sent to 
Rushdi. He was requested to use all means necessary to prevent a 
confrontation with the British. The Ottomans agreed to send a 
delegation to the border to survey the area in order to determine 
whether it belonged to Egypt or the Ottomans (Hurewitz, 1989, p. xiii). 
The Ottoman officers who were assigned to carry out this mission, 
however, postponed their arrival in the border area. During the second 
half of March and into April 1906, the Egyptian authorities tried 
unsuccessfully to find the Ottoman delegation. Rushdi claimed that he 
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did not know their whereabouts or their authority. Meanwhile, Egyptian 
authoritities tried to convince Rushdi to leave Taba and refused to 
withdraw Egyptian forces from Faroun Island (Rushdi, 1910, p. 62). 
The British government became concerned about the behavior of the 
Ottoman survey delegation. The British ambassador in Istanbul protested 
and demanded the withdrawal of Ottoman troops from Egyptian territories. 
The Ottoman response was they would not withdraw until the delegation 
made a report. The British then decided to put more pressure on the 
Sultan, informing Istanbul that they were going to send more naval 
vessels to Aqaba (Toye, 1989, p. 179). The Ottomans then moved to 
cooperate with the Egyptians. On April 2, they informed the British 
that, according to the delegation's report, the disputed area was 
located within Ottoman territories. They were not willing to negotiate 
with Britain over the Egyptian border and instead were only willing to 
negotiate with Egypt directly (Toye, 1989, p. 190). 
During the month of April, Istanbul and Cairo exchanged many 
telegrams regarding the border issue. The Ottoman position was the 
following: 
1. Egypt's eastern border is a straight line from El-Arish to 
Suez, according to the Firman of 1841. The Sinai territories given to 
Egypt in 1892 were a trust. 
2. Egypt's population is an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. 
3. The Egyptian military forces are part of the Ottoman forces. 
4. Egypt does not have the right to establish diplomatic ties with 
foreign countries. 
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5. Great Britain does not have the right to be in the Taha area. 
Only the Egyptian Khedive may be involved in this issue (Mitwali, 1989, 
pp. 135-42). 
The Egyptian Khedive, backed by Lord Cromer, strongly opposed 
Istanbul's position. He demanded the demarcation of the border 
according to the Firman of 1892, and the joint letter of the Grand Vizir 
which confirmed that the Egypt-Ottoman boundary was a line extending 
from Rafah to Aqaba. London perceived Istanbul's position as a 
violation of the 1892 understanding. The government decided to put more 
pressure on the Ottomans by rallying the European powers and threatening , 
the use of force. 
In facing the British threat, the Sultan tended to compromise. He 
suggested dividing the Sinai peninsula. He offered the Khedive control 
of, without claim of privilege, all of Sinai ex~ept the triangular area 
located between El-Arish, Suez and Aqaba (see Figure 5). Egypt refused 
to accept the offer and demanded Rafah-Aqaba as a separation line. The 
Sultan of Istanbul proposed an alternative partition which would extend 
straight from El-Arish in the north to Ras Muhammad on the southern tip 
of the peninsula (see Figure 5). The fate of the second proposal was as 
the first (Heyd, 1963, p. 199; Hurewitz, 1989, p. xv). 
Lord Cramer's position was to push the Ottomans to the east as far 
as possible. Both Ottoman suggestions on partitioning the Sinai 
peninsula contained a big threat to the Suez Canal. Cromer believed 
that the Germans were encouraging the Ottomans in their confrontation 
with the British (Toye, 1989, p. 207). Ottoman plans to construct a 
branch of the Damascus-Al-Hijaz railway to reach Aqaba would not only 
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threaten the Suez Canal, but also disrupt possible British construction 
of a railway from Cairo to the Persian Gulf via Aqaba (Heyd, 1963, p. 
202). 
Britain moved to put an end to the tug of war with the Ottoman 
Empire after a provocative incident which took place on April 28, 1906, 
at Rafah. An Ottoman army unit occupied Rafah and pulled out two old 
telegraph poles which had been emplaced as pillars marking border points 
between Egypt and Palestine since 1898. On May 3 Great Britain, 
supported by France and Russia, issued an ultimatum to the Ottoman 
Sultan to vacate Taha and agree to the demarcation of the Rafah-Aqaba 
line within 10 days. If the Sultan failed to comply with the demands, 
the British government would use force and "the situation will be grave" 
(Hurewitz, 1989, p. xvi). To prove its determination, British naval 
vessels were sent to Greek waters at Piraeus and ordered to be ready to 
occupy two small Ottoman islands in the Agean sea, Liminos and Mytilene, 
and to stop all Ottoman ships in the Mediterranean (Bloomfield, 1957, p. 
122). 
The Sultan's response after the British actions in the Aegean Sea 
was immediate. He sent a letter to the British ambassador in Istanbul 
confirming that the Ottomans would respect the understanding of 1892 and 
that they no longer had any claims in the west of the Gulf of Aqaba. 
British Ambassador O'Connor responded that the Sultan should take steps 
to confirm that by vacating Taha and demarcating the boundary (Toye, 
1989, p. 407). The Sultan suggested a proposal to solve the crisis 
containing the following points: 
45 
1. The British would give recognition to the Sultan's sovereignty 
over Egypt. 
2. The Sultan would give confirmation of all the firmans regarding 
Egypt. 
3. The Sultan would give agreement to defend Egypt and the Suez 
Canal on the side of Britain in the case of threat. 
Moreover, Istanbul suggested that both sides vacate the Taha area 
and the assign a joint Ottoman-British commission to demarcate the 
boundary. British officials rejected the Sultan's proposal and demanded 
unconditional compliance with the British ultimatum (Toye, 1989, pp. 
465-66). Two days before the deadline, the Ottomans agreed to vacate 
Taba and to discuss the demarcation of the boundary between Egyptian and 
Ottoman officers (Rushdi, 1910, p. 83). Lord Cromer achieved another 
compromise from the Sultan. While the Firman of 1892 and the letter 
from the Grand Vazir mentioned the boundary as a line running from El-
Arish to Aqaba, the British demanded a line running from Rafah 25 miles 
to the east of El-Arish to at least three miles west of Aqaba. By 
agreement, the boundary line was termed a Khat Fasil Idarih, i.e., an 
"administrative separating line". 
At the end of May, the British-Egyptian delegation to the talks on 
the demarcation of the boundary arrived in Aqaba. Owen, the chief of 
security intelligence, and the Egyptian minister, Ibrahim Pasha Fathi, 
joined by two British engineers met with the Ottoman representatives, 
including two Ottoman officers stationed in the border area, Phahmi 
Mohammad and Mozaphar Ahmad. 
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The British and Ottoman Suggestions for the Demarcation 
The joint commissioners on the boundary demarcation were in 
disagreement from the beginning. Their argument was over the exact 
location of the starting point, of the administrative line three miles 
west of Aqaba. While the British-Egyptian delegation demanded measuring 
the three miles on the ground, the Ottomans were in favor of more 
precise measurement from the air as opposed to less accurate ground 
measurements (Rushdi, 1910, p. 103). Although the joint commission 
worked together alongside the border from Aqaba until they _reached 
Rafah on June 28, they drew separate lines and came up with conflicting 
suggestions. 
The Ottomans suggested a line which deviated in order to take into 
consideration the Aqaba-Gaza road and centers alongside the road which 
should be within Ottoman territories. They started the administrative 
separating line from Ras Taba on the Red Sea coast (i.e. from Taha Cape, 
on the Gulf of Aqaba) crossing the top of the hills reaching El-Mafrak, 
and from there followed the Aqaba-Gaza road to the top of Ahekiba 
mountain where they turned to the northwest to Bir-Ajrod. The line 
continued following the Aqaba-Gaza road until it reached the important 
centers of Quseima and El-Muweilih and included them within Ottoman 
territories. It passed El-Rwafah in El-Arish Wadi, following the wadi 
until it reached El-Makdabah. From there the tribal limits of Syarkah 
-
and Tarabin served as the line until reaching Rafah (see Figure 8). 
The British-Egyptian delegation, joined by two British engineers, 
Keeling and Wade, drew a guideline extending straight from Umm-Rashrash 
3¾ miles west of Aqaba to Rafah. Ras en Naqb was the first point it 
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reached. Faced with topographic obstacles, they turned to the northeast 
and followed a straight line until they reached Rafah at 29° 36 1 N 
latitude and 35° 52' 8 11 E longitude. The line was straight and deviated 
only as the topography dictated in the Jebel Kharuf/Jebel Arif en-Naqa 
area and in the Ras en Naqb-Gulf of Aqaba section (Mitwali, 1989, pp. 
225-26; see Figure 8). 
The two delegations discussed the different proposals but failed to 
agree on one line. Both delegations informed their governments of their 
respective lines and arguments. At this point, the decision became one 
to be made at the highest levels. Both governments reconciled their 
differences and on September 13, 1906, sent telegrams regarding their 
agreement to the joint commission. The agreement reached was based on 
four principles. 
1. The area along the coast of the gulf b~tween Ras Taba and El-
Mafrak to the east should belong to Aqaba (Ottomans). El-Mafrak itself 
and the area between Ain Kadies and Quseima, including Ain-Gedeirat, 
would belong to Sinai (Egypt). The line between Mafrak and Rafah should 
be very close to a straight line, as suggested by the Egyptian 
delegation. 
2. Pillars should be constructed along the line by the joint 
commission. 
3. The boundary was agreed to be subject to transhurnance. Bedouin 
tribes living on both sides of the line would have the right to make use 
of water resources on the western (Egyptian) side of the line; moreover, 
Ottoman soldiers and gendarmes could do so as well. 
4. The Bedouin tribes should continue living on their own lands 
and using water sources as before the demarcation (Mitwali, 1989, p. 
242). 
The joint commission then redrew the line based on the four 
principles mentioned above and on October 1, 1906, both parties signed 
the agreement. 
The Demarcation Agreement of 1906 
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The demarcation agreement was written in two copies in Turkish, the 
official language of communication between Cairo and Istanbul. In 
addition, the two parties agreed to translate the agreement into English 
and Arabic. It should be pointed out that only Turkish copies and the 
joint map were signed by both parties. The agreement was titled, 
"Agreement signed and exchanged at Rafah on October 1, 1906, between the 
Commissioners of the Turkish Sultanate and Commissioners of the Egyptian 
Khedive concerning the fixing of a separate administrative line between 
the villayet of Hijaz and Governorate of Jerusalem and the Sinai 
peninsula" (Mitwali, 1989, p. 244). 
The agreement mentioned in the beginning the names of the 
representatives of both parties and their titles. It included eight 
articles. It will be useful to have the text of the first article. 
The Separating Line, as shown on map attached to this 
Agreement, begins as Ras Taha on the western shore of the 
GULF OF AQABA and extends to the summit of the mountain 
lying east of and overlooking WADI TABA, and from the summit 
of JEBEL FORT the Separating Line extends by straight lines 
as follows: 
From JEBEL FORT to a point not exceeding two hundred 
metres to the east of the summit of JEBEL FATH! PASHA, 
thence to that point which is formed by the intersection of 
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a prolongation of this line with a perpendicular line drawn 
from a point two hundred metres measured from the summit of 
JEBEL FATH! PASHA along the line drawn from the centre of 
the summit of that hill to MOFRAK POINT (THE mofrak is the 
junction of the GAZA-AKABA and NEKHL-AKABA roads). From 
this point of intersection to the hill east of and 
overlooking THAMILET EL RADADI--place where there is no 
water--so that the THAMIIA (or water) remains west of the 
LINE, thence to the summit of RAS RADADI marked on the above 
mentioned map as A. 3., thence to summit of JEBEL SAFRA 
marked as A. 4., thence to summit of eastern peace of UM GUF 
marked as A. 5., thence to that point marked as A. 7. north 
of THAMILET SUEILMA thence to that point marked as A. 8. on 
the west-north-west of JEBEL SUMAUI, thence to summit of 
hill west-north-west of BIR MAGHARA (which is the well in 
the Northern branch of the WADI MA YEIN, leaving that well 
east of the SEPARATING LINE), from thence to A. 9., from 
thence to A. 9. bix west of JEBEL MEGRAH, from thence to RAS 
EL AIN marked as A. 10. bis, from thence to a point on JEBEL 
UM HAWAWIT marked as A. 11., from thence to half distance 
between two stone pillars (which pillars are marked as A. 
13.) under a tree hundred and ninety metres south-west of 
BIR RAFAH, it then runs in a straight line at a bearing-of 
280° of the magnetic north (viz., 80° to the west) to a 
point on a sand hill measured four hundred and twenty metres 
in a straight line from the above mentioned pillars, thence 
in a straight line at a bearing of 334° of the magnetic 
north (vix., 26° to the west) to the MEDITERRANEAN SEA 
12 passsing by hill of ruins on the SEA SHORE. (Mitwali, 
1989, pp. 245-246) 
Article II described how the line was drawn on the annexed map and 
confirmed that both sides had signed the map. Article III dealt with 
intervisibility between pillars. Article IV stated that both parties 
were to protect the pillars. Article V mentioned that in case a need to 
renew the pillars, both parties should send representatives to 
accomplish the renewal. Article VI confirmed that it was the right of 
all tribes, Ottoman soldiers, and gendarmes to use the water resources 
as it was before the demarcation. Article VII confirmed the right of 
Bedouin tribes to continue to own waterwheels and land as before 1906 
(Rizik, 1989, pp. 366-67). 
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Demarcation on the Ground 
The process of demarcating the line contained two stages: (a) 
surveying the topographical features of the area, and (b) construction 
of the pillars. In the first stage, the joint commission surveyed and 
mapped an 8 km strip alongside the line from the Gulf of Aqaba to Rafah 
on the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, they placed guiding stations, 
each based on astronomical observations of latitude and longitude. It 
should be pointed out that points 1, 9 and 10, for topographic reasons, 
did not keep to the principle of intervisibility, i.e., each pillar 
could not be seen from those adjacent to it from both vantage points. 
In order to guarantee functional intervisibility, the joint commission 
marked 1, 9 and 10 bisects (El-Deeb; 1979, pp. 134-36). According to 
the demarcation, the administrative separation line started on 29° 29 
16" N latitude on Ras Taba on the Gulf coast and ended on 31° 17 46" N 
latitude on the Mediterranean beside Rafah. The line approximately 
follows 34° E longitude. Its starting point at Taba is 34° 55 9" E and 
its ending point at Taha is 34° 14 20" E. The 14 stations and their 
locations are found on Table 1. 
The second stage of the demarcation was the construction of pillars 
along the extension of the line. The joint commission started this time 
from Rafah and moved to Taha. They built telegraph pillars every 1-2.5 
km keeping the principle of intervisibility. The first pillar at Rafah 
was marked No. 1 and the last one was No. 91 at the top of Ras Taha. 
The base of the pillars stood 2.5 meters high. Pillars were constructed 
in the shape of a pyramid with its top sheared off and with an iron pole 
coming out of the top. The overall placement was in straight lines 
52 
Table 1 
Demarcation on the Ground 
Point Location Latitude North Longitude East 
1 on the Gulf sea shore at Taba 25° 29' 16" 34° ss• 9" 
1 bis. on Ras Taba 29° 29• 12.4 34° ss• 5" 
2 Alrnafrak 29° 31' 52" 35° oo• 39" 
3 Ras el Raddadi 29° 38· 31" 34° 53, 42" 
4 Top of Jabal Safra 290 41' 09" 34° 52' 24" 
5 Jabal Om-Guf 29° 45' 29.2" 34° 51' 55" 
6 Ras el Geradi 29° 53' 53" 34° so• 08" 
7 on a hill between Thamilat 30° 06· 58" 34° 42• 45" 
and Suielma 
8 on the top of the hill 30° 22' 14" 34° 37' 02" 
northwest of Jabal Sarnawi 
9 Jabal Kharuf 30° 29' 39" 34° 33, 48" 
9 bis. Jabal Kharuf 30° 31' 39. 8 11 34° 31• 44" 
10 Ras el Ain/Gederat 30° 39, 03 11 34° 26' 08" 
10 bis. Ras el Ain 30° 39, 34" 34° 29' 52" 
11 Jabal Om Hawawit 30° 51' 37" 34° 25' 46" 
12 Khashm el-Garn 30° 57' 42" 34° 25' 01" 
13 80 meters south of Rafah 31° 17' 46" 34° 14· 20 
14 Tal el-Kharayib on the 
Mediterranean coast 31° 17' 48.9" 34° 14• 20" 
Note. (El-Deeb, 1979, p. 136). 
connecting with each other forming a geometric boundary for the 
extension of 210 km (El-Deeb, 1979, pp. 137-38). It is of unique 
interest to note that, in spite of agreements and demarcation, the 
memoirs of a former British governor of the Sinai (Jarvis, 1932, end 
paper) still show the boundary beginning east of Rafah and ending west 
of Taha. 
Physical Features of the Boundary Line Area 
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The boundary line between Egypt and Palestine separated two 
geographic units. Southern Palestine, known as en Naqb (Negev), 
occupied 11,700 km2 and the Sinai peninsula composed 60,000 km2 • As in 
most cases in the Middle East, the boundary line crossed semi-arid and 
arid areas. Scarcity of water is common, and broad-leafed deciduous 
shrubs and short grasses form the natural vegetation (Held, 1989, p. 
334). 
In the northern section of the boundary in the Gaza Strip and 
Rafah, the low land that prevails is the sandy coastal plain of the 
Mediterranean Sea (see Figure 1). Southward the elevation increases and 
in the Auja area, hills covered with gravel deposits and sand are 
common. Farther south, the area continues to rise and become more rigid 
and more sharply sloped. Elevations reach in some cases 1000 m. In the 
Ras en Naqb and Taba area the precambrian fundament of plutonic and 
metamorphic rocks are exposed. The boundary line ends at Taba on the 
Red Sea, which is part of the Rift Valley. 
Climatically, the northern section enjoys a Mediterranean type of 
climate. Precipitation ranges between 200-375 mm (8-15 in.) in the Gaza 
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Strip. This amount of rain falls entirely in the winter and supports 
agricultural activities mainly of citrus and grains. S~uthward at Auja, 
the steppe prevails. The amount of precipitation is less. Farther 
south at Taba, the desert climate is common and the area receives less 
than 100 mm (4 in.) of precipitation. Temperatures become very high and 
there is a large durinal range of temperature (United States Department 
of States, 1961, p. 3). 
The population of the area in 1906 was nomadic, moving back and 
forth between the two regions, Sinai and en Naqb. These tribes 
concentrated mainly in the center section of the border in the Auja area 
and farther north. In the coast area, permanent dwellings were 
maintained. By 1906, El-Arish, Rafah, and Khan-Yunis were permanent 
settlements, as was the older Gaza. 
The ultimate establishment of Israel in 1948 would markedly change 
the human landscape. Nomadic movement decreased and Jewish agricultural 
settlements were constructed in the frontier. The administrative line 
of 1906 became one separating Egyptians on one side from Israelis on the 
other, from a few kilometers south of Rafah to the Gulf of Aqaba. 
Factors Related to Demarcation of the Agaba-Rafah Line 
The British imposed the Aqaba-Rafah line. It was never mentioned 
in the Sultan's firmans. The British perceived this line as the best 
for several reasons: (a) politico-geographic, (b) human, and (c) 
topographic. 
Politico-Geographic Factors 
By adopting the Rafah-Aqaba line, Great Britain could exercise 
control over the entire Sinai peninsula. It was the deepest line 
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possible Britain could demand from the declining Ottoman Empire at that 
time. This line could protect the Suez Canal better than the former 
Ottoman suggestion of El-Arish-Suez, El-Arish-Ras Muhammad or El-Arish-
Aqaba lines. Moreover, it was the shortest possible line between the 
two water bodies, the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. From a 
military perspective it could be defended easier than the other lines. 
The scarcity of population in Sinai made it into a "natural barrier" 
(Curzon, 1908, p. 16). In terms of Sinai, El-Arish was the most 
populated town, and it could serve as a strategic base for defense 
against possible attack on the Suez Canal. By depriving them of control 
of El-Arish, the Ottomans would have a major obstacle in case of war 
against Egypt. 
Bramly, the British officer stationed in Sinai who surveyed the 
area, had suggested a line which deviated from that which was eventually 
accepted in order to follow physical features and the distribution of 
Bedouin tribes along the border area (see Figure 6). His proposal was 
rejected for being too long, for giving the Ottomans greater advantages 
(such as water resources), and for being too close to El-Arish. In 
addition, Bramly had suggested attaching the southern portion of Wadi 
Araba to Egypt. British policy-makers did not believe that the Ottomans 
were willing to compromise so much even if war were threatened (Brawer, 
1979, p. 371). 
Human Factors 
The British planned to command as many resources as possible in the 
area. By depriving the Ottomans of water resources and routes, they 
gained defensive advantages. The British surveyors who studied the 
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water resources available on the Sinai peninsula supported the notion of 
the Rafah-Aqaba line because this line guaranteed most of the water 
resources lay on the Egyptian side. It is not surprising that the 
British, according to the demarcation agreement, granted water for 
"Turkish soldiers, native individuals and Gendarmes" by using sources 
west of the separating line (Brawer, 1970, p. 7). It should be pointed 
out that the agreement did not include a statement of the right of 
Egyptian or British soldiers to acquire water from the east side because 
the British knew that there was little left for the Ottomans on that 
side, which was extremely poor. 
In addition, the Rafah-Aqaba line gave the British and the 
Egyptians the major travel routes. The most important was the Gaza-
Aqaba route. Most of it ran in the southern section within Egyptian 
territories. Furthermore, the Egyptians commanded the most important 
junctions and passes linking Palestine with Egypt. These are Ras en 
Naqb, Quseima, and Kuntilla. While the British could easily transport 
goods and keep solid communications on the western side, the Ottomans 
were left in extreme difficulty on their side of the line. 
The British, who perceived the Bedouins as a nomadic people, 
ignored the fact that the straight line from Aqaba would split tribes 
and clans on both sides. Unlike Bramly, who suggested a line which 
considered and safeguarded Bedouin lands and properties, the line 
adopted by British policy-makers cut through the lands of three large 
tribes in Sinai (Tarabin, Taiyah, and Haiwat) and yet allowed them 
travel rights back and forth through the line (Brawer, 1970, p. 8). 
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Topographic Factors 
According to the agreement signed between the Ottomans and the 
Egyptians, the administrative separation line linking the western edge 
of Rafah with a point three miles west of Aqaba should be straight. But 
there were two major deviations declared by the topography of the 
region, one lying between Jabal Kharuf and Jaba Arif en-Naqa in the mid-
section of the boundary, and the other one lying in the southern section 
between Ras en Naqb and the Gulf of Aqaba. Jabal Kharuf is a very harsh 
and rugged mountain, attaining an elevation of 1080 m. and possessing 
very deep and narrow gorges around it. The deviation of the southern 
section was due to high and rugged mountains and deep ravines which 
prevent the possibility of drawing a straight line with the principle of 
intervisibility of the pillars (Brawer, 1970, p. 107). It should be 
emphasized that the demarcation was carried out in hot and dry weather 
and in the process, some mistakes were made. The British 
representatives, who were not accustomed to such conditions, wanted to 
complete the work as soon as possible. One of the most obvious mistakes 
was that the last pillar (No. 91) at Ras Taha extended six miles from 
Aqaba instead of the three mentioned in the agreement (Brawer, 1970, p. 
107-08). 
The status of the boundary did not change until 1914 and until then 
the frontier area was quiet. Following the eruption of World War I, 
Great Britain separated Egypt from the Ottoman Empire. It declared 
Egypt a protectorate in 1914, deposed Khedive Abbas II Hilmi, and 
installed his uncle Husayn Kamil with the new title of Sultan of Egypt 
(Vatikiotis, 1991, p. 253). From that time British maps indicated the 
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separate administrative line of 1906 as an international boundary. The 
Ottomans sided with Germany and Austria-Hungary during the war and 
opened a campaign in 1915-16, attempting to capture the waterway of 
Suez. It failed. The British occupied the Sinai peninsula and Aqaba in 
1917. They expanded farther north which they perceived as deepening the 
defense of the Suez Canal. With the end of the war in November 1918, 
Great Britain exercised control over the entire Levant and both sides of 
the 1906 boundary. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE EGYPT-PALESTINE BOUNDARY, 1918-48 
A direct outcome of World War I regarding the Egypt-Palestine 
boundary was that it became a boundary within the British Empire. Since 
Great Britain controlled both sides of the boundary, the line might have 
lost some of its significance. The issue of sovereignty, however, was 
still a question. While the status of the territories to the west 
(Egypt) was obvious, the status of the eastern side (Palestine) was 
still ambiguous. According to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 between 
Great Britain and France, an Arab country should be declared on the east 
side of the 1906 boundary line (Goldschmidt, 1983, p. 184). Moreover, 
it should be pointed out that the Balfour Declaration of 1917 did not 
mention the subject of boundaries (Goldschmidt, 1983, p. 234). 
After the occupation of Palestine at the close of the year 1917, 
the British initially moved to establish their control and interests. 
At that time Britain was a conqueror, not a mandatory power. The 
Mandate over Palestine would be awarded two years later at the Paris 
Peace Conference in 1919. 
Proposals for the Boundary Changes Before 
the Paris Peace Conference 
The question of the viability of the 1906 boundary was discussed 
among British officials more intensively during 1918, and after the end 
of the First World War different proposals were made. The common 
feeling among the participants in the discussions was that the 1906 
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boundary should by changed, A new factor was involved in the boundary 
issue after the Balfour Declaration of 1917: the World Zionist 
Organization. Except suggestions from Zionists, all other proposals 
came from British officers who had been stationed on both sides of the 
boundary in Egypt and in Palestine. Since the status of Palestine was 
yet to be determined, British concerns tended to push the boundary 
further to the northeast in order to enhance the buffer zone protecting 
the Suez Canal. Two distinct trends in the discussions followed. The 
British officers who had been stationed in Egypt suggested a line 
running approximately from Rafah to Beer Sheva to the Dead Sea, and 
officers who had served in Palestine proposed a line to the west of the 
1906 boundary to be laid along El-Arish Wadi in the northern section of 
the 1906 line. At this same period, the Zionist Movement, which had 
earlier demanded the boundary of the Jewish national homeland to run 
from Dan (in the north of modern Israel) to Beer Sheva, adopted the 
"historical southern limit of Erets Israel" to be along the El-Arish 
Wadi (Brawer, 1982, p. 75). 
The phrase "Erets Israel" can be translated as "the land of 
Israel." When used by Zionists or Israeli commentators, it can have the 
sense of "the rightful homeland of the Jewish people." When used by 
Zionists before 1948, it suggests what territories should be included in 
an area where Jews can freely settle or what territories should be 
within an independent Jewish state. When used after 1948, it refers to 
the territories Israelis and others who accept the common Zionist view 
believe to be historically the Jewish homeland, with or without a 
connotation that such territory should be included, if it is not 
presently, within the Israeli state. 
The Paris Peace Conference 
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Before the Paris Peace Conference and following, there was much 
disagreement among British policy-makers regarding the boundary. Arnold 
Toynbee, a member of the British political delegation, was nominated to 
prepare a complete memorandum on the 1906 boundary line. The British 
political delegation submitted to the conference Toynbee's proposal for 
a new boundary extending from a point "5 miles west to Tafila going west 
in a straight line. It meets the 1906 line at Auja and then in a 
straight line northwest to El-Arish." Hogarth, a British officer in 
Egypt who was asked to confirm the suggestion instead authored a new 
proposal recommending a new boundary line farther north, extended from 
"a point on the Mediterranean following Gaza Wadi to a point south of 
the Dead Sea and then through Wadi Araba to a a point in the northeast 
on the Aqaba Gulf" (Biger, 1981, p. 128) (see Figure 9). The most 
extreme suggestion came from Parker, the governor of Sinai, who 
suggested a boundary line beginning farther to the north of what is 
today Gaza Strip--and then following Hogarth's line. 
Other proposals by British officers and officials stationed in 
Egypt were made, but the most well-known was made by General Allenby, 
the British Governor of. Egypt, and T.E. Lawrence (the famous Lawrence of 
Arabia), a member of the British delegation sent to the Paris Peace 
Conference (see Figure 9). This proposal was to establish a separate 
area termed Mandate (C) which was to include the triangular region 
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between Rafah-Aqaba-Tafila, because this area was formerly under Ottoman 
control and it was felt that this should be placed under the direct 
control of the British Empire (Biger, 1981, p. 132). 
All proposals were suggested under the uncertainty of a Palestine 
Mandate. There were common agreements regarding the Wadi Araba line 
from south to north, but not on the Mediterranean-Dead Sea line from 
west to east. The Zionist delegation, under pressure from the British, 
eased its demands. It should be pointed out that unlike the other 
Palestine frontiers, the British Government and the Zionist Movement 
were in disagreement regarding an appropriate Egypt-Palestine boundary. 
While they held common interests and agreement regarding the boundary in 
the north and the east, they were at odds in the south and as a result, 
the Zionist delegation never mentioned the exact boundary line they were 
demanding at the Peace Conference. Several months later in the summer 
of 1919, Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization, 
wrote to Sir Herbert Samuel, British High Commissioner for Palestine, 
asking for the Rafah-Aqaba line to include the port of Aqaba itself 
(Waingradov, 1965, p. 6). 
The British delegation at the Peace Conference proposed one final 
line which was close to the first suggestion (see Figure 10). All 
discussions mentioned above had been held in secret within the British 
delegation itself, which perceived the issue as a British one. By the 
end of 1919, the British government was certain of the Mandatory power 
it would obtain over Palestine. The Peace Conference convened on April 
1, 1919, at San Remo and the European delegations signed an agreement on 
the mandates. At that time the British again began rethinking what 
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constituted the boundary of 1906. Unlike the Palestine border in the 
north, British control officially extended on both sides in the south. 
The government decided to maintain the 1906 boundary line without any 
redefinition of its status (Brawer, 1982, p. 76). 
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The British decision upholding the 1906 boundary was actually a 
compromise between different proposals and political ideologies. The 
adoption of the 1906 line was temporary. Britain, which apprehended the 
boundary as a line within its Empire, did not give publicity to 
administrative divisions between Egypt and Palestine. 
Although Britain controlled both sides of the boundary line, there 
was not any significant joint administration in the area. After the 
conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference, in July 1920 London Government 
established a British civil administration in Palestine without 
determining Palestinian boundaries. By October 1920 the civil 
administration in Palestine was in charge of the railway system in 
Palestine. However, the railway line which was built during World War I 
by the British across the Sinai peninsula between Rafah and Qantara on 
the west bank of the Suez Canal was left under the control of the 
British military in Egypt (Biger, 1981, p. 134). 
Factors Related to the Proposals 
Although the boundary line of 1906 failed to change after the Paris 
Peace Conference of 1919, the British held serious concerns and 
interests regarding the line which led to the different proposals. 
These factors can be considered separately: 
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Strategic Factors 
In the First World War, new weapons were introduced, especially air 
forces and large extended-range artillery. The British wanted to draw a 
new line which was defensible and to deepen the distance buffer from the 
Suez Canal, taking into account the ability of these new weapons in 
striking deep behind enemy lines. They were also concerned about the 
latest advances in capability for mass troop movements. Most of the 
proposals depended on physical features which could serve as obstacles 
for crossing and penetration, features which would slow and hinder the 
ability of enemy armies from reaching the Canal Zone. 
Human Factors 
The 1906 administrative line cut through the nomadic lands of 
several Bedouin tribes and separated the tribes of Palestine from those 
of Sinai. After the demarcation of 1906, the movement of nomads 
continued as before. The new-proposals considered this factor extremely 
important, as had Bramly's proposal in 1906 (see Figure 6). Some 
proposals considered Gaza, Rafah, and Beer Sheva as centers for the 
tribes and included them .within Sinai territories. 
Economic Factors 
The British highly valued the natural resources of the Dead Sea. 
They planned to exploit these resources and transfer them overseas via 
the Red Sea. In addition, the Standard Oil Company, an American oil 
company which surveyed the Kurnub area southeast of Beer Sheva, planned 
drilling there (Biger, 1981, p. 136). The possibility of cultivating 
the land was the main factor in the Zionist Movement's demands for the 
area between Rafah and El-Arish. For the same reason, British officers 
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in Egypt rejected the idea because the British wanted to reserve use of 
the land for defense and were concerned about surrender_ing it .. 
Geopolitical Factors 
While the Zionist Movement demanded the inclusion of Aqaba in 
Palestinian territories, the British wanted Aqaba as part of Sinai. The 
Zionist Movement wanted to separate Al-Hijaz from Sinai and Egypt, and 
the British planned to keep the Gulf of Aqaba under their control, where 
they desired to improve port facilities. When the British were certain 
about the Palestinian Mandate, they preferred the bridgehead of the Red 
Sea to be in Palestine (Biger, 1981, p. 136). 
The Boundary After the Paris Peace Conference 
The southern limit of the Sanjak of Jerusalem did not follow the 
1906 line in its whole extension as far as the Gulf of Aqaba. In 1922, 
King Abdullah, who was offered the Emirate of Transjordan one year 
earlier in the Cairo Conference of 1921, demanded to annex the area to 
the south of the former Sanjak of Jerusalem. But the British chose to 
continue their control over southern Palestine too. 
Increasing confrontation and unrest in Egypt following the First 
World War, especialy during the years 1918 and 1919, convinced the 
British that Egyptian nationalism could no longer be suppressed by 
military means. The demand for independence by Egyptians was 
overwhelming. On February 28, 1922, London unilaterially announced the 
independence of Egypt. Sultan Fuad of Egypt became King Fuad I. 
Egyptian independence did not prevent Great Britain from continued 
intensive control over Egypt by British advisers (Vatikiotis, 1991, p. 
261-264). 
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Following the Lausanne Treaty of July 1923 and Turkey's declaration 
of renunciation of all rights and titles over Egypt, the question of 
Egypt's sovereignty over Sinai and its eastern boundary was raised 
(Toye, 1989, p. 734). John Fischer Williams, a legal assessor of the 
Sinai Mining Company, raised the question in December 1926, whether 
Sinai was Egyptian territory on August 1, 1914, the beginning of World 
War I. The issue was debated on a reparation claim with the British 
foreign office. The official response was "the boundary thus 
established [from Rafah to Aqaba] was in effect an administrative 
division between two Ottoman provinces" (Toye, 1989, p. 734). Earlier 
in the same year, Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmad Ziwar Pasha wrote to 
Lord Lloyd "recognizing the special position of His Majesty's Government 
in relation to the territories of Palestine and of Irak," asking if the 
eastern Egyptian frontier will be affected by the delimitation of 
Palestinian and Iraqi territories. In response, London assured Egypt 
that the Palestine-Egypt frontier "as defined in the year 1906" would 
not be affected (Toye, 1989, p. 719). 
The question of Egyptian s·overeignty was raised again after the 
Second World War. Bramly, the British Empire's administrative officer 
in the Sinai peninsula during the demarcation of the 1906 line, insisted 
that the agreement of 1906 between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire failed 
to settle the issue of the legality of the eastern Egyptian boundary. 
In a letter sent to the foreign office in 1946, he proposed that Britain 
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claim the Sinai peninsula for itself by the right of conquest. Bramly 
suggested the establishme.nt of military bases in Sinai (Toye, 1989, p. 
743). During the year 1947, several papers were written supporting and 
opposing Bramly's position regarding the status of the Sinai peninsula. 
Those in support of Bramly's proposals, argued that Sinai--except for 
the northwest corner--was never part of the privileged territories of 
Egypt (Recall the Ottoman position in 1906.). Furthermore, following 
the Lausanne Treaty, the Sinai peninsula turned into a "no man's land" 
(res nullius) after the renunciation of Turkey's claims and titles over 
Egypt. Those opposed to Bramly's proposals argued that Britain assured 
Egypt regarding the status of the boundary in 1926, in Lord Lloyd's 
letter reading that the boundary will be "as defined in the year 1906" 
(Toye, 1989, p. 219). In addition, England and Egypt had signed a 
Treaty of Alliance in 1936. Finally, Egypt had received implicit 
acceptance of the 1906 boundary from the League of Nations upon joining 
in 1937 (Warburg, 1979, pp. 687-89). 
From the period 1918-47, and in spite of all attempts to alter the 
1906 line, the boundary remained as demarcated in that year. The 
movement of Bedouin tribes crossing that line continued, but was 
reduced. In the 1940s the nomadic people tended to adjust to the new 
reality and the line became more of a line of separation than in 
previous decades. During the Second World War, the British neglected 
the existence of the boundary and troops, supplies and miscellaneous 
equipment crossed as if it did not exist (Brawer, 1982, p. 77). 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EGYPT-ISRAEL BOUNDARY I, 1948-67 
The modern history of Palestine began with a series of partition 
plans. The confrontations between Arabs and Jews during the British 
Mandate and the unbridgeable gap between them led to the formation of 
various commissions of inquiry on Palestine. As early as 1937, the Peel 
Commission suggested a division of Palestine into two states, Jewish and 
Arab. The argument over the principle of partition and the allotment of 
lands accelerated when the British Government asked, in April 1947, the 
United Nations Secretary General to place the problem of Palestine on 
the agenda of the United Nations. London recommended sending another 
commission to do an inquiry on the issue. 
Though Britain likely preferred specific plans for partition to 
others, because of its continuing interests in the Canal and in Trans-
Jordan, i.e. for reasons similar to those discussed earlier in reference 
to the period 1918-1922, the issue of partition was by 1917 much more 
multi-national in scope. Changes in the status of India (partition and 
independence in August 1947) may also have influenced Britain to place 
greater responsibility on the United Nations (Lloyd, 1984, p. 328). The 
question of to what extent Britain expected to retain its authority 
within Egypt under the treaty of 1936 (Vatikiotis, 1991, p. 322) or in 
Trans-Jordan is important in the history of the region that is separate 
from the issues considered here. In fact, the British announced an 
intention of withdrawing and accepted United Nations involvement in 
partition. 
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The United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP), after 
investigation, recommended the partitioning of Palestine. On November 
29, 1947, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on the 
partitioning of Palestine. Arabs, mainly the Egyptian and Trans-
Jordanian Governments and the Arab people of the former Palestine 
Mandate, rejected the resolution on the basis of principle (Goldschmidt, 
1983, p. 224). They claimed that the United Nations did not have the 
jurisdiction to partition countries and demanded that the issue be 
referred to the International Court of Justice. 
The various proposals for partitioning Palestine referred to the 
Egypt-Palestine boundary as an international one. All the proposals 
concerned territory east of the Rafah-Aqaba line. The question was over 
which country was going to share the boundary with Egypt. While 
according to the Peel Plan of 1937 only the Arab state would share the 
border with Egypt, the United Nations Partition Plan allowed both newly 
proposed states to share portions of this line (Hadawi, 1959, p. 41; 
Gilbert, 1974, p. 38). The Rafah-Aqaba line, which extends for 210 km, 
was proposed to be allocated between the two parties. The portion of 
the line extending 110 km from the area of Rafah in the northern section 
to Auja and further to the southeast was to belong the the Arab State, 
while the remaining 100 km in the southern section was proposed to be 
given to the Jewish State (see Figure 11). 
The partition plan of November 29, 1947, failed to end the 
hostilities between Arabs and Jews. Well-trained and equipped Jewish 
soldiers led by the Haganah, the Jewish Army, were highly successful in 
battle. By May 15, 1948, the Israelis had occupied portions of the 
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territories allocated to an Arab State. The British Mandate 
authorities, who were supposed to withdraw by August 1948 according to 
the Partition Resolution of 1947, announced their desire to terminate 
the Mandate on the 15th of May after Israel declared its independence on 
the 14th. The Palestinian Arab High Committee appealed to the Arab 
states. They declared their willingness to take measures to prevent the 
establishment of the Jewish State. On May 15th, 1948, joint Arab armies 
entered Palestine. The Egyptian forces penetrated the Rafah-Aqaba line. 
By June of 1948, southern Palestine was under the control of the 
Egyptian forces, especially along coastal areas including Ashqelon and 
Ashdod. They reached a point 30 km south of Tel-Aviv (El-Sayid, 1985, 
p. 28). 
During the period of the fighting between May 1948 and January 
1949, the UN Security Council issued eight cease fire resolutions which 
were violated by both parties. While the first truce of May 29 was 
violated by Egypt, the second truce of July 18 was violated by Israel. 
By initiating Operation Horev on December 22, 1948, the Israelis occuped 
the southwest section of Palestine, capturing Auja and advancing into 
Sinai. Their raids reached Bir Hasna and Bir Hama in the heart of 
Sinai, and only the cease fire saved El-Arish from coming under 
occupation (see Figure 12) (Lorch, 1961, p. 490). 
There was a strategic reason behind Operation Horev and the 
penetration of the Rafah-Aqaba line into Sinai. The existence of Israel 
as a new state was accepted by the world's most powerful countries, but 
its boundaries were not. Israel, which proclaimed its independence on 
May 15, 1948, did not define its boundaries. The southern section of 
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Palestine, en Naqb, was disputed. The British Government was still 
interested in that area. Israel attempted to gain complete control over 
southern Palestine after a suggestion was made by the UN mediatior, Dr. 
Ralph Bunche, to exchange southern Palestine (en Naqb) with the northern 
area of Galilee as part of the new Arab State. Galilee was already 
occupied by Israel (Lorch, 1961, p. 491). Britain, watching the theater 
carefully, demanded the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian 
territories behind the Rafah-Aqaba line and threatened to intervene and 
expel the Israelis from Sinai under the title of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty of 1936. During Operation Horev the Israelis shot down a British 
airplane which circled over the battlefield area, killing five British 
soldiers. In response, the British strengthened their garrison at Aqaba 
(Lorch, 1961, p. 525). 
By January 6, 1949, Egypt accepted the cease fire and entered into 
negotiations with the Israelis. Egypt was still holding some positions 
in southern Palestine (Lorch, 1961, p. 525). 
The Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement of 1949 
The Armistice negotiations between Israel and Egypt started on 
January 13, 1949, in the Hotel of Roses on Rhodes in the Mediterranean. 
The Egyptian delegation demanded immediate Israeli withdrawal from 
positions captured after the UN Security Council Resolution of November 
4. They meant for Israel to abandon positons captured in Operations 
Yoav and Horev (Lorch, 1961, p. 535). The Israelis insisted upon 
Egyptian forces withdrawing from all territories within the former 
Palestine Mandate. As a starting point, UN mediator Bunche convinced 
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both delegations not to renew hostilities. The first crisis in the 
negotations was over the Faluja (an area 40 km east of Ashqelop on the 
way to Beer Sheva). The Egyptians and the Israelis were in disagreement 
over the evacuation of a besieged brigade of Egyptian forces, which 
contained a third of their forces in Palestine, from Faluja. One of the 
commanders of this army was Gamal Abd El-Nasser, who three years later 
became the leading officer in the Egyptian Revolution and then President 
of Egypt. The Israelis exploited the isolation of the Egyptian forces 
at Faluja as a bargaining chip. 
The defeated Egyptian Army agreed to most of the Israeli demands 
and an Armistice demarcation agreement was signed on February 24, 1949, 
under the auspices of the United Nations. According to the terms of the 
agreement, Egypt exercised control over what became the "Gaza Strip," 
and a demilitarized zone around Auja was established. Later, on 
February 22, 1950, a modus vivendi to the General Armistice Agreement 
cleared up the armistice line by delimiting the Gaza Strip within the 
Armistice Agreement of 1949 (The Geographer, 1961, p. 2). 
The Armistice line of 1949 between Israel and Egypt follows the 
Egypt-Palestine line of 1906. It extended between the Gulf of Aqaba and 
the Gaza Strip, just 8 miles from the Mediterranean Sea (see Figure 13). 
The demarcation was based on Article I of the Egypt-Ottoman agreement of 
1906, which explained the Rafah-Aqaba line in detail. The status of the 
Armistice line was clarified in Paragraph II of Article V. 
The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any 
sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is 
delineated without prejudice to the rights, claims and 
positions of either party to the Armistice as regards 
ultimate settlement of the Palestinian question. (United 
Nations, 1949, p. 256) 
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The Demilitarized Zone 
The first paragraph of Article VIII stated the following. 
The area comprising the village of El-Auwja and vicinity, as 
defined in Paragraph 2 of this Article, shall be 
demilitarized, and both Egyptian and Israeli armed forces 
shall be totally excluded therefrom. The chairman of the 
Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article X of this 
Agreement and United Nations Observers attached to the 
commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full 
implimentation of this provision. 
Paragraph 2 added the following: 
The area thus demilitarized shall be as follows: From a 
point on the Egypt-Palestine frontier five (5).kilometers 
north-west of the intersection of Rafah-El-Auwja road (MR 
08750468), south-east to Khashm El-Mamdud (MR 09650414) 
thence south-east to Hill 405 (MR 10780285), thence south-
west to a point on the Egyptian-Palestine frontier five· (5) 
kilometers south-east of the intersection of the old railway 
tracks and the frontier (MR 09950145), thence returning 
north-west along the Egypt-Palestine frontier to the point 
of Origin. (United Nations, 1949, pp. 261-62) (see Figure 
14) 2 
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Auja is an Arab village located in the central section of the 
Egypt-Palestine boundary just three km from the boundary line. The area 
of Auja has two main advantages which caused heated arguments during the 
negotiations of the Armistice Agreement. First, the topographic 
features of the area include a hill which gives the party in control of 
it strategic advantage. From Auja, conceivably, the dominance of the 
Sinai desert and the en Naqb Desert is possible. Second, the area 
contains the strategic crossroads from Beer Sheva to Cairo. and Gaza to 
2 MR denotes "Map Reference." 
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Aqaba. Moreoever, this crossroads was a_ station on the pilgrims route 
to Mecca (Al Mawsoah al-Phalastinia, 1984, p. 358; Alexander, 1954, p. 
325). 
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The importance of the area led to a crisis during the Armistice 
negotiations. Egypt claimed that the area was supposed to be allocated 
to the Arab State according to the Partition Plan, and Israel, which 
exercised military occupation over the area, refused to withdraw its 
claims over the highly valued area. 
Israel, which realized the determination of the Egyptians not to 
sign the agreement without Auja, agreed to the demilitarization. The 
sovereignty of the area was ambiguous. In response, Israel demanded and 
achieved the demilitarization of the area facing Auja in the Egyptian 
section. The Egyptian delegation agreed for Quseima and Abu-Aweiqila, 
26 km farther west in Sinai desert, to be areas without defensive 
positions (El-Sayid, 1985, p. 55). 
Israel, which realized the importance of the Auja area for military 
purposes in the First World War, moved to occupy the demilitarized zone. 
The President of the joint commission for the demilitarized zone 
informed the UN Security Council on September 21, 1955, that Zahal (the 
Israeli Defense Forces) had occupied the area. One year later the joint 
commission was prevented from holding its meeting at its headquarters in 
the village of Auja. In October 1956, Israel launched a major assult on 
Egyptian forces from Auja (Higgins, 1969, p. 108). 
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The Gaza Strip 
On the eve of the beginning of the Armistice Agreement between 
Egypt and Israel in February 1949, the Egyptian forces were stationed in 
the Gaza area. Moreover, this area was crowded by native Palestinian 
Arabs and by Arab refugees from areas which had been allocated according 
to the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947 to the Arab State. Under 
the Armistice Agreement, Egypt exercised control over the area defined 
as the Gaza Strip. 
The Gaza Strip came into existence only after the conclusion of the 
1949 Armistice demarcation line. The limit of the strip followed the 
cease fire lines between the Israeli forces and the joint Egyptian-
Palestinian forces. Paragraph 1, Article VI of the General Armistice 
Agreeement stated the following. 
In the Gaza-Rafah area the Armistice Demarcation Line shall 
be as delineated in Paragraph 2.B(i) of the Memorandum of 13 
November 1948 on the implimentation of the Security Council 
Resolution of 4 November 1948, namely by a line from the 
coast at the mouth of the Wadi Hasi in an easterly direction 
through Deir Suneid and across the Gaza-Al Majdal Highway to 
a point 3 kilometres east of the highway, then in a 
southerly direction parallel to the Gaza-Al Majdal Highway, 
and continuing thus to the Egyptian frontier. (United 
Nations, 1949, p. 258) 
Gaza Strip covers 360 km2 (139 mi2 ) of territory. It extends for a 
length of 45 km (28 miles) from northeast to southeast with an average 
width of 7 km (4.5 miles) facing the Mediterranean Sea on the west end 
of the Egypt-Palestine boundary line in the south and the demarcation 
line in the north of Gaza just 7 km (4.35 miles) to the north of the 
city (see Figure 15). On February 22, 1950, one year after the signing 
of the Demarcation Agreement, a modus vivendi to the General Armistice 
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altered and limited the northern and eastern parts of the Gaza Strip 
demarcation line. Paragraph 1, Article I of the Modus Vivendi is the 
following. 
(a) the "A" Zone is delineated as follows: It is the Zone 
between the demearcation line and a line from M.R. 10170-
11160 in a straight line to point M.R. 10690-10740 at the 
railway crossing and then in a stright line to point M.R. 
10795-10640, to point 72,9 M.R. 10900-10565, to point 82,2 
M.R. 10 9180-10410 and then to the demarcation line at point 
95,1 M.R. 10695-10240 (all points inclusive to Egyptian 
side). 
(b) the "B" Zone is delineated as follows: It is the Zone 
between the line delineated in paragraph (a) above and the 
Egyptian fighting line north of Beit Labia. 
(c) the "C" Zone is delineated as follows: It is the Zone 
between the demarcation line and a line from point M.R. 
08935-08590 in a straight line to point 76,6 M.R. 09035~ 
07970, M.R. 08970-07790 and from this point to the 
demarcation line at M.R. 08735-07670 (all points inclusive 
to Egyptian side). (United States Department of States, 
1961, p. 5) (see Figure 10) 
Southern Palestine 
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During the 1948 War and the beginning of 1949, Israel gained 
control over most of the area of southern Palestine (en Naqb). Israeli 
forces reached Ein Hosb by Operation Lot, and Auja by Operation Horev 
(Lorch, 1961, p. 537). Yet a large triangle between these two locations 
and the Gulf of Aqaba, which was bounded by the 1906 Egyptian boundary 
in the west and El-Araba in the east, remained (see Figure 16). Most of 
the southern part of Palestine was allocated, according to the Partition 
Plan, to the Jewish State. During the Armistice negotiations, Egypt 
removed its claims over the area. Transjordan, which had some of its 
military units locked up in the harsh, rugged, and unpopulated area, 
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claimed it; Transjordan exercised military control there when the cease 
fire began (Lorch, 1961, p. 537). 
Israel, which signed the Armistice Agreement with Egypt in February 
of 1949 and began negotiations with Transjordan on March 1, launched on 
March 5 the final military operation to conquer the southern tip of 
Palestine. The Israeli forces penetrated the Jordanian truce lines on 
March 7 and reached the Gulf of Aqaba on March 11 (Lorch, 1961, p. 537). 
Now Israel controlled the whole eastern side of Rafah-Aqaba line of 
1906. The Partition Plan apportioned 56 percent or 15,850 km2 of the 
total territory of Palestine for the Jewish State. Over 9,500 km2 of 
this area was in the southern part of Palestine. After the 1948-49 War 
and the conclusion of the Armistice Agreements, the Jewish State held 
20,770 km2 of territory, of which the southern portion comprised around 
13,000 km2 of the total area (Kliot, 1987, p. 61). 
The Egypt-Israel Boundary, 1950-56 
As soon as the Armistice agreement was concluded and signed, Egypt 
and Israel were in disagreement over its interpretation. Moveover, 
incidents which took place along the border accelerated tensions in the 
area. During the summer of 1950 Israeli authorities expelled an 
estimated 6,000-7,000 Bedouins belonging to the Azazme tribe from the 
demilitarized zone and other areas to Sinai across the international 
border. Others were deported by Egypt back to Israel from Sinai. 
Furthermore, about 2,000 Palestinians were expelled from El-Majdal 
(which became Ashqelon after 1948) to the Gaza Strip. Egypt complained 
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to the Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) which decided that "these Arabs 
be repatriated to the Israeli-controlled area" (Higgins, 1969, p. 147). 
The refugee problem caused considerable trouble along the border 
area. Many Palestinians had been begun crossing the border back to 
their properties inside Palestine. The early crossings and incidents 
along the border originated from innocent motives. Confirmation of the 
right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland by the United 
Nations General Assembly in December 1948 increased the number of 
crossings to Israel. Moreover, some crossings were accidental because 
the demarcation line was no longer clear in some areas. Israel claimed 
the crossings were for theft and smuggling and deaths resulted when 
crossers where shot (Khouri, 1968, pp. 183-84). 
The question of the demilitarized zone was one of the issues most 
affecting the border area and the Demarcation Line Agreement. The 
Israeli Government exploited the ambiguous paragraph in the agreement 
regarding the DMZ and moved to take it over. As early as September 
1953, Israel established Kibbutz Qetsiot within the demilitarized area. 
The settlement expanded to establish other kibbutzes in that area. 
Moreover, Israel decided to confine the movement of the United Nations 
observers in the demilitarized z~ne. Later, Israel refused any entree 
to Auja to the Egyptian members of the MAC. The commission was not 
allowed to meet in its headquarters in Auja so it did not fully function 
after October 1951. In September 1956, Israeli Prime Minister David 
Ben-Gurion stated: "No meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission at 
Auja should be allowed" (Higgins, 1969, p. 156). The justification 
presented was "Egypt's non-compliance with Article I and the security 
council resolution of 1st September 1951 concerning interference with 
the passage through the Suez Canal of shipping bound for Israel" 
(Higgins, 1969, pp. 156-57). 
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The controversy over the right of Israeli passage through the Suez 
Canal directly affected the behavior of the two parties along the 
border. Israel insisted on Article I of the Armistice Agreement 
reading, "No agressive action by the armed forces--land, sea, or air of 
either party shall be undertaken, planned .... The establishment of an 
armistice between the armed forces of the two parties is accepted as an 
indispensible step towards the liquidation of armed conflict and the 
restoration of peace in Palestine" (United Nations, 1949, p. 254). 
Egypt argued the military meaning of the agreement and referred to 
Article V of the Agreement stating, "The Armistice Demarcation Line is 
not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, 
and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of 
either party to the Armistice ... " (United Nations, 1949, p.256). 
Egypt, which initiated an economic boycott against Israel in 1948, 
started searching for and in some cases confiscating goods and items 
shipped to Israel through the Suez Canal. Moreover, Israeli ships were 
not allowed to pass through the canal. Egypt justified its measures 
claiming that a state of war still existed with Israel, and that Egypt 
had these reduced rights of belligerence. Israel emphasized that the 
United Nations Charter prevented members from using the rights of 
belligerence against other members, pointing to the intent of the 
Armistice Agreement. As early as 1949 Israel complained to the MAC 
88 
regarding Egypt's action. In September 1951, the Security Council 
passed a resolution in favor of the Israeli position (Khouri, 1968, pp. 
205-06). 
The incidents along the border area between Egypt and Israel, 
mainly along the Gaza Strip front, intensified in late 1954 and during 
1955. Arabs tended to sabotage settlements which Israel constructed and 
fortified very close to the demarcation line and Israel retaliated and 
in some cases initiated actions behind the border. In February 1955, 
Israel attacked the town of Beit-Hannun in the northern section of Gaza 
Strip, resulting in at least 39 deaths. Egypt retaliated in August 1955 
by establishing the Fedayeen group which took action and raided the 
Israeli frontier settlements, again resulting in deaths. The raids and 
counter-raids continued, leaving both sides with hundreds of casualites, 
mostly civilian. An Israeli writer suggested in 1955: 
There is a feeling in Israel that the only way to get the 
reluctant Arabs to the peace table is to make the armistice 
situation disadvantageous to them ... Those bloody "border 
incidents" are seldom accidental. . . They are part 
retaliation, part a deliberate plan to force the Arabs to 
the peace table. Some call it "realistic," others 
"cynical"--but it promises to be effective. (Brilliant, 
1955, pp. 68-9) 
Besides the local clashes along the border, regional and 
international actions hastened the confrontation of 1956 between Israel, 
Britain and France on one side, and Egypt on the other. The behavior of 
Nasser, the Egyptian president, and his policy were the core of these 
actions. Nasser's buying weaponry from communist countries, his 
formation of diplomatic relations with China and his non-aliens policy 
caused him to be perceived with intransigence in western eyes 
(Vatikiotis, 1991, p. 391). Because the U.S. administration was 
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displeased with Nasser's actions, it suspended the American offer to 
help construct the High Dam at Aswan. Nasser's retaliation was 
dramatic. He announced on July 26, 1956 the nationalization of the Suez 
Canal Company. Western countries condemned Nasser's action. While the 
Americans supported a diplomatic solution, France and Britain demanded 
military action to restore their rights in the Canal Zone. France and 
Britain likely wished to remove Nasser, who was accused by France of 
supporting the Algerian rebellion. Britain, after the formation of the 
Bagdad Pact of 1955, apprehended Nasser as a threat to the peace and 
stability of the region (Vatikiotis, 1991, pp. 390-393). 
Israel was a major beneficiary of the new situation. Strong anti-
Nasser sentiment after the nationalization of the Suez Canal encouraged 
Israel to invade Egypt. The goal of the destruction of the Fedayeen 
bases in Egyptian territories and in the Gaza ~trip encouraged Israel to 
act. Moreover, opening the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba for Israeli 
shipping and forcing Egypt to abolish the Arab boycott against Israel 
were important reasons behind the invasion (Khouri, 1968, p. 214). By 
the end of October, Israel, Britain and France were in a common 
agreement regarding the Suez Canal crisis and the actions which should 
be taken to end it. 
Israel penetrated the Egyptian lines on October 29, 1955, and 
approached a line just 10 km east of the Suez Canal in two days (see 
Figure 17). Earlier, it declared its suspension and denunciation of the 
Armistice Agreement (Higgins, 1969, p. 109). On October 31 the French 
and British forces, which were stationed in the Mediterranean Sea and on 
Cyprus, bombed Egyptian airports and landed at several places in the 
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Canal Zone. By November 6 the French and British forces occupied Port 
Said, the Egyptian city at the mouth of the canal. On the same day, 
Soviet Prime Minister Alexander Polganin issued two ultimata to Israel, 
Britain, and France to stop the fighting and to withdraw from Egyptian 
territories. Moreover, the U.S. administration announced its opposition 
to the invasion and initiated a UN Security Council meeting calling for 
an "immediate cease fire" and "prompt withdrawal" of Israel forces. 
France and Britain accepted a cease fire on November 6 and Israel on 
November 8 (Khouri, 1968, p. 217). While France and Britain withdrew 
immediately, Israel completed its withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza Strip 
by March 8, 1957. 
The Egypt-Israel Boundary, 1957-67 
As one outcome of the 1956 War, the United Nations Emergency Forces 
(UNEF) was established. These forces were stationed along the 
demarcation line in the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian side of the 
demarcation line and in Sharm esh-Sheikh (see Figure 18). Israel 
refused to accept UNEF forces on its side (Higgins, 1969, p. 335). The 
rules of the peacekeeping forces were to monitor the withdrawal of 
forces and to guarantee free navigation and compliance with UN 
resolutions. The Gulf of Aqaba opened for Israeli ships. Egypt 
continued to close the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping. 
During 1957-59, Egypt permitted the passage of foreign ships to 
Israeli ports but after that restored the restrictions, stopping ships 
and checking and confiscating certain types of cargo bound for Israel. 
It began to search for and confiscate Israeli-owned commodities. The 
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situation along the Armistice Demarcation Line was quiet for a few 
years, but in the first half of the 1960s incidents took place along the 
border mainly as air violations. According to UNEF Report 667, 
incidents took place during 1961-62 and according to Reports 669, 630, 
664, in the following three years (Higgins, 1969, p. 335). However, 
they were minor compared with other incidents along the Israel-Jordan 
and Israel-Syria lines. 
Tensions between Syria and Israel in 1965-67, in part over the 
diversion of Jordan River waters, led to military cooperation between 
Syria and Egypt. The Nasser government moved into the frontier area 
with Israel. Nasser's aim was apparently to assure the Israeli 
Government of his willingness to interfere in favor of Syria if the 
former was attacked by Israel. The Egyptian military movement started 
on May 15, 1967. Egypt requested on the following day the withdrawal of 
UNEF forces. U-Thant, the United Nations Secretary General, ordered the 
evacuation on May 19 (El-Sayid, 1985, p. 152). Egypt blockaded the 
Straits of Tiran on May 23 (see Figure 17). Israel perceived the latter 
Egyptian action as a casus belli. 
The Israeli Government's Perspective on 
the Boundary, 1948-67 
Territorial and border issues concerning Palestine were of great 
import to Zionists before 1948, and they have remained important in the 
Israeli Government since the establishment of the Jewish State. On the 
eve of the proclamation of Israel, on May 14, 1948, and prior to the 
Arab invasion, Zionist decision-makers opposed the boundaries of the 
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Partition Plan, and these boundaries were not included in the Israeli 
Independence Convention. David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime 
minister, stated that the Yishoav, the Jewish community in Palestine, 
should oppose the territorial partition of the UN. He believed that the 
UN partition proposal was harmful in terms of military matters and the 
future protection of a Jewish State (Bar-Zohar, 1978, pp. 500-01). 
On June 14, 1948, the Israeli Government held the first discussion 
regarding the boundaries of Israel. The dominant proposal was that 
Israel should exercise permanent control over the territories allotted 
for the Arab State and occupied by Jewish troops, in addition to the 
control ~f territories allocated to the Jewish State in the United 
Nations partition plan of 1947. The Israeli Government accepted the 
recommendations of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion not to make any decision 
while the military situation was still fragile, so the first decision 
regarding the boundary issue taken by the Israeli Government was to wait 
and not to decide. Two weeks later, on July 2, the Israeli Government 
decided to include the occupied territories allocated for an Arab State 
within its control. Israel did not accept the United Nations 
resolutions calling for withdrawal from those territories. During 1949, 
Israel signed armistice agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and 
Syria (Rawder, 1980, p. 280). 
The Demarcation Line System between Israel and Egypt collapsed in 
October 1956 when Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the Sinai 
peninsula. Earlier and since March 1955, Israel had adopted a new 
territorial doctrine. While between the years 1949-54 Israel tended to 
accept the Armistice Demarcation Line as the permanent boundary line 
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between Israel and Egypt, in 1955 it demanded changes in the boundary 
line. Ben-Gurion, returned to service in the Israeli Government as 
Defense Minister and supported by Moishe Dyan, the Israeli Chief of 
Staff, initiated a plan in April 1955 to occupy the Gaza Strip and the 
western coast of the Gulf of Aqaba. He sought to eliminate the raids on 
Israel which were coming from the Gaza Strip and to open the straits of 
Tiran to Israeli vessels for free passage. Ben-Gurion considered the 
annexation of the Gaza Strip to Israel and the deportation of the 
population to Egypt and Jordan as a possible permanent solution to 
terrorist actions and raids (Rawder, 1980, pp. 334-35). Six months 
later, he' gave publicity to his thoughts in an interview with a New York 
Times journalist on September 27, 1955. But only on October 28, 1956, 
did the Israeli Government pass his plan. 
Ben-Gurion was used to making decisions without bothering with 
consulting others. In a speech given by him on July 11, 1956, in the 
Knesset (the Israeli Parliament), he explained that the goal of the 1956 
Israeli attack on Gaza Strip was "to free the homeland from the Egyptian 
invader," and added "The Sinai Desert never was an Egyptian territory." 
One day before, on November 5, 1956, he spoke in front of Israeli 
soldiers at Sharm esh-Sheikh proclaiming the creation of the third 
Israeli Kingdom (Rawder, 1980, p. 341). 
The international condemnation of the joint British-French-Israeli 
invasion of Egypt pressured Ben-Gurion and the Israeli Government to 
agree to withdraw from Sinai and the Gaza Strip. Ben-Gurion continued 
to look at the possibility of making arrangements with Egypt for Israeli 
navigation through the Suez Canal and finding better solutions to 
protect Israel from the raids coming from Gaza. 
Social Consequences of the Egypt-Israel 
Boundary, 1949-67 
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The creation of the State of Israel drastically altered the 
uneventful nature of the boundary of 1906. It was an antecedent to 
Jewish settlement. In the early 1950s and during the year 1967 
following Jewish immigration to Israel, the Israeli Government built 
tens of settlments in the frontier. Nahal (National Pioneer Youth) is a 
branch of the Israeli Defense Forces. Israeli youth belonging to this 
group do agricultural work near their settlements and sometimes engage 
in military activities (Gilbert, 1974, p. 59). In the early 1950s 
nomadic movement across the line was totally stopped. The Bedouin 
tribes in the border area either moved to Egypt or were deported by 
Israel, small portions of them being transferred to the Beer Sheva area 
farther north from the boundary. Again, the sealed boundary became an 
ethnic separation line: the Arab population (Egyptian and Palestinian) 
on one side, and the Jewish population on the other to the north 
(Brawer, 1979, p. 374). 
In addition, the landscape along the-boundary area drastically 
changed. On the Israeli side, even with the very limited water 
resources the Ottomans have been reluctant to accept in 1906, grasses 
and trees could be grown without any threat of consumption by Bedouin 
animals, while .on the other side the animals continued to eliminate the 
grasses and scattered trees in the area. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE EGYPT-ISRAEL BOUNDARY II, 1967-78 
The June War of 1967 
Early in the. morning on Tuesday, June 5, 1967, the Israeli air 
force severely damaged most military airfields throughout Egypt, 
reaching south to the Sudanese border area. This operation was followed 
by a large scale penetration of the boundary between the two countries 
by armored Israeli infantry. A few days later Israel and Egypt agreed 
on a new cease fire line (see Figure 19). The Suez Canal, the use 
ofwhich was one of the main factors behind the 1967 War, became the 
separation line between the two parties. The canal was closed to 
international navigation due both to geo-political circumstances and 
wreckage, and it remained closed until 1975 (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, p. 
289). 
The immediate outcome of the 1967 War along the Egyptian frontier 
was that Israel suddenly controlled as much as three times its previous 
land area. An irony was that its effective border with Egypt was 
shortened from 242 km to 168 km along the Suez Canal. Control of the 
Sinai peninsula gave Israel a great strategic advantage. The 60,000 km2 
area contains Sharm esh-Sheikh near its southern tip, the entrance to 
the Gulf of Aqaba leading to the Israeli port city of Elat. Moreover, 
it gave Israel strategic depth in a shorter border. A few years later 
it was obvious that the area held promises for economic development 
(Drysdale & Blake, 1985, pp. 291-292). 
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Between 1967-78 Israel invested heavily in the area, militarily and 
otherwise, exploiting the economic resources of Sinai and the Gaza Stip 
and integrating them into the Israeli national economic system. 
Agricultural settlements were built, especially in the area between 
Rafah and El-Arish. 
Israel's Security and the Boundary Issue 
Formulating a peaceful settlement between two members of the 
international community following a war is presumed to be u_nder the 
jurisdiction of international law. In this case, following the June War 
of 1967 and the occupation of Sinai and the Gaza Strip on the Egyptian 
front and other Arab territories on other routes, the United Nations 
Security Council adopted Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967. The 
Resolution required both "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from 
territories occupied in the recent conflict" (Perry, 1977, pp. 416-
417), and: 
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and 
respect for and acknowledgement of sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of every state in the 
area and their right to live in peace within secure and 
recognized boundaries free from threat or acts of force. 
(Blum, 1971, pp. 119-20) 
The Resolution became the blueprint for any possible settlement between 
Israel and Egypt and the other Arab neighboring states involved in the 
1967 confrontation. 
From its establishment in 1948 up to the occupations of 1967, 
Israel expressed dissatisfaction with its security and the vulnerability 
of its borders. Following the adoption of UN Resolution 242, Israeli 
officials insisted in their demands on "secure and recognized 
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boundar[ies]," hinting at possible changes in the armistice lines with 
the Arab countries. 
Yehuda Blum, the former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, 
argued that the Armistice Demarcation Line with Egypt was neither 
"boundaries" nor "secure" nor "recognized." He added that Israel could 
not tolerate Egyptian air forces just five minutes flying time from the 
center of industry and population of the state. Moreover, it was 
unacceptable that Israel had only five miles outlet on the Red Sea 
between the Jordanian and Egyptian boundary lines (Blum, 1971, pp. 72-
75). 
A variety of interpretations of UN Resolution 242 regarding the 
"withdrawal clause" still exist today after the final withdrawal from 
Sinai Peninsula. While the Israelis insist on the English version of 
Article I of the Resolution which reads, "Withdrawal of Israeli forces 
from territories occupied in the recent conflict," the Arabs interpret 
this Article as meaning a complete withdrawal, maintaining the French 
version of the Resolution (the other UN working language at that debate 
when the Malian representative was the President of the UN Security 
Council and spoke in French). This version is interpreted to call for 
withdrawal from all occupied territories. The French version reads, 
"Retrait des forces armees israelienns des territories occupes lors du 
recent conflict," adding that the other versions in UN languages 
(Spanish, Russian, and possibly Chinese) called for total withdrawal 
from the occupied territories. Moreover, the resolution emphasized "the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." For the Arab 
states, the omission of the definite article does not necessarily 
distort the meaning of the resolution (Perry, 1977, p. 417). 
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Israel does not accept the requirement of total withdrawal from 
occupied territories. It underlines the acceptance of the UN Security 
Council, in Resolution 242, that every state has the "right to live in 
peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts 
of force," and as Article II paragraph 3 of the Resolution affirms, "the 
necessity for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political 
independence of every state in the area, through measures i_ncluding the 
establishment of demilitarized zones" (Blum, 1971, pp. 119-20). 
The very slow pace of political activities following the June 1967 
War and the unwillingness of Israel to comply with UN Resolution 242 led 
to a long round of hostilities on the Suez front between Egyptian and 
Israeli forces. These hostilities, which were known as the War of 
Attrition, extended for 1,000 days between 1968-70. It caused many 
casualties for both parties but no territorial changes occured. The 
fifth round of major hostilities between Egypt and Israel were to come 
three years later in the October War of 1973. 
The October War of 1973 
Between 1971 and 1973 the Nixon Administration tried to act as a 
mediator between Egypt and Israel towards the aim of bringing lasting 
peace between the two countries. A political formula was proposed by 
Secretary of State William Rogers in October 1971. U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, traveled between the two countries 
several times without any lasting accomplishment. The Israeli 
102 
Government assured the Nixon Administration of its desire not to return 
to the boundary prior to 1967 and its insistance on exercising control 
over Sharm esh-Sheikh. Other efforts were made by UN mediator Gunnar 
Jarring. 
The possibility of negotiations between the two countries failed to 
materialize. This situation led to the creation of a climate of 
inevitable continuing confrontation. During the last two years prior to 
October 1973, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat was under domestic 
pressure to initiate war against Israel to restore the Sinai peninsula. 
Several thousand students demonstrated in the streets of Cairo on many 
occasions·, demanding "arming [of] the masses" (Sobel, 1974, p. 55). 
The war which followed has been referred to by many names, 
including the Ramadan War and the Yorn Kippur War. It erupted at 2:00 
P.M. on October 6, 1973, along the Egyptian and Syrian fronts with 
Israel. After 24 hours of fighting, the Egyptian forces succeeded in 
crossing the Suez Canal occupying the famous Israeli fortification known 
as the Bar-Lev Line. On the other hand, Israeli forces later succeeded 
in crossing the canal to the west side and isolated the Egyptian Third 
Army in a counterattack. The Soviet Union and the United States became 
deeply involved in the war, resupplying the parties with new weapons. 
Both countries initiated a major airlift of military equipment to 
compensate the parties for their losses. Moreover, the two superpowers 
threatened to intervene and the U.S. military was, for a limited time, 
in a state of high alert. The United Nations Security Council debated 
the hostilities; actions were taken on the 8, 9, and 11 October, but it 
failed to adopt any resolutions or actions to bring about the end of the 
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hostilities. The Nixon administration initiated a proposal for a cease 
fire, calling for a cession of hostilities and a return to positions 
held before the eruption of the war (Sobel, 1974, p. 91). On October 17 
the representative of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exportation 
Countries (OAPEC) passed a resolution cutting oil supplies to the United 
States and Western European countries. These attempts were made to 
bring about a change in U.S. policy in the Middle East. 
On October 22, 1973, the Security Council adopted its first 
resolution, No. 338, regarding the war calling for an immediate cease 
fire. The Resolution was sponsored by both superpowers. The resolution 
called for the implementation of UN Resolution 242 adopted in November 
1967 and a beginning of negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. 
Violations of the truce, especially by Israel which continued to fight 
to the west of the Canal, led to two other resolutions on October 23 and 
25, Nos. 339 and 340 respectively, recalling the first Resolution of 
October 22 and deciding to send United Nations Emergency Forces to the 
areas of hostilities. Within a bit more than one year, by mid-January 
of 1975, 7,000 UN peace-keeping forces were stationed in a buffer zone 
between the two parties. 
The U.S. was involved in intense diplomatic activity during the war 
to stop the hostilities. The U.S., led by Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger, sponsored a six-point truce between the two countries. The 
agreement was endorsed by both parties on November 9. The six-point 
agreement included food supplies to Suez City (which was under seige) 
and an agreement to discuss the separation of forces and disengagement 
under the auspices of the United Nations (Sobel, 1974, p. 93). 
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The First Disengagement Agreement 
While the major confrontations between Egypt and Israel in 1948, 
1956, and 1967 ended with clear military victories for Israel, the 1973 
War ended without so obvious a winner. The war left both parties 
standing on new and vulnerable lines, from which neither side could 
tolerate a suprise attack from the other. It was obvious that both 
parties were interested in a separation of forces to new, defensible 
lines. 
The disengagement negotiations started in a tent at kilometer 101 
on the Suez-Cairo highway. General Gamasy and General Yarev were the 
representatives of Egypt and Israel respectively. U.S. Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger was behind the scenes pushing for a positive 
conclusion to the talks. The U.S. role in the negotiations was 
essential. It wanted to derive a credit which would influence the Arab 
oil producers to lift their embargo and to promote its position in the 
Arab world (Touval, 1982, p. 243). During the negotiations "shuttle 
diplomacy" was employed by Kissinger between Tel-Aviv and Cairo until 
the agreement was signed on January 18, 1974, with the chiefs of staff 
of both countries and General Siilasvue (the Commander of UNEF) in 
attendance. The United States offered incentives to Egypt and continued 
military aid to Israel in order to encourage both parties to sign the 
agreement. 
According to Article B of the agreement, Israel was to withdraw its 
forces from the west to the east side of the canal and concentrate 
behind line B (see Figure 20). The Egyptian forces on the east side of 
the Suez Canal were to be deployed to the west of the line designated as 
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Egyptian and l3raeli li ne3, 0ct.24, 1973 
Based on: (Gilbert, 1974). 
Figure 20. First Disengagment Agreement, January 1974. 
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line A. Paragraph 2 of Article B stated: "The area between the 
Egyptian and Israeli lines will be a zone of disengagement in which the 
United Nations Emergency Forces will be stationed." The buffer zone was 
eight kilometers in width. Moreover, the agreement limited the Egyptian 
forces between line A and the Suez Canal to an area of a depth of about 
eight kilometers and the Israeli forces between lines Band C (Sobel, 
1974, p. 156). The Egyptian Government did not succeed in regaining the 
important strategic passes at Mitla and Gidi. The separation of forces 
was completed on March 4. One week earlier Egypt resumed diplomatic 
relations with the U.S. which had been severed since the 1967 War (Metz, 
1991, p. 301). 
The Second Disengagement Agreement 
The Nixon Administration exploited the new circumstances of 
negotiation between Israel and the Arab states. On May 31, 1974, U.S. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger succeeded in bringing Israel and 
Syria to a disengagement agreement. The U.S. wanted to keep the 
momentum and continue to lead activities to bring peace to the Middle 
East. During the first half of 1974, Middle East issues were the top 
priorities of the U.S. administration. The second attempt to bring 
Egypt and Israel to a new disengagement agreement succeeded in September 
1975. Since the first agreement, President Anwar Sadat had continued to 
press for further withdrawals of Israeli troops so he could open the 
Suez Canal and strengthen his ability to protect it. Israel demanded a 
political agreement between the two countries. It wanted the abolition 
of the state of belligerence and an end to economic warfare against 
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Israel. Israel rejected the Egyptian demand of withdrawal from the 
strategic passes and the oil fields on the western coast of Sinai. On 
March 22 Henry Kissinger concluded his efforts due to inability to bring 
the parties to a new agreement. 
The U.S. administration turned to a carrot and stick policy. It 
delayed economic and military assistance to Israel and signaled to the 
Israeli Government the necessity for further compromises. After 
inviting leaders of both countries, Prime Minister Rabin and President 
Sadat, both parties agreed to the essential points. Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger returned in the middle of August to another shuttle of 
diplomatic efforts in the Middle East and on September 1,1975, 
representatives of both counties signed the second agreement; 
The second agreement was modeled after the first one, but with 
three buffer zones between the two parties and areas with limited forces 
and armaments (see Figure 21). It was limited in time and the agreement 
needed annual renewal by the Security Council. Israel agreed to vacate 
the oil fields and the strategic passes (Touval, 1982, pp. 262-266). 
Early warning systems were established by both sides to monitor the 
troop movements of the other. The Egyptian early-warning station was 
very close to the Israeli line, and the Israeli station was within the 
buffer zone farther to the west. The United States convinced both 
parties to be present in the buffer zone beside the UN forces. U.S. 
civilian personnel were to monitor the activities of both parties in the 
early warning stations for a range of agreed functions. In the poliical 
arena, Egypt agreed to ease the economic boycott against Israel and 
agreed to Israeli passage of non-military ships and cargos through the 
Mediterranean Sea 
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Suez Canal. Both parties agreed to solve their problems by peaceful 
means and not to resort to the use of force (Touval, 1982, pp. 262-66). 
In the course of implementing the Second Disengagement Agreement, a 
new political reality began to arise. Egypt became more and tolerant of 
the U.S. approach as political activities to bring about a lasting peace 
continued. A dramatic visit to Israel by Egyptian President Anwar Al-
Sadat in November 1977 led to further peace negotiations, concluding in 
the Camp David Agrement of 1978. A peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel was signed under the auspices of the Carter Administration on 
March 26, 1979. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE EGYPT-ISRAEL BOUNDARY III, 1980-1992 
The Israeli Withdrawal From Sinai 
Following development of the "framework for peace" in the Middle 
East agreed upon at Camp David, dated September 17, 1978, and the 
signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of March 26, 1979, another 
phase of change in the Egypt-Israel boundary had begun to occur. 
Paragraph II of Article I of the Treaty stated: "Israel will withdraw 
all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the 
international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine and Egypt 
will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai." 
Article II stated: 
The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the 
recognized international boundary between Egypt and the 
former mandated territory of Palestine without prejudice of 
the issue of the status of Gaza Strip. The parties 
recognize this boundary as inviolable. (The Egyptian-
Israeli Treaty, 1979, p. 4) 
Moreover, the Treaty, in Annex I, set out stages and a time table for 
the Israeli withdrawal. 
As a security arrangement between the two countries, the Sinai 
peninsula was at one time divided by 2 lines of longitude--A and B--and 
was further divided into three zones (see Figure 22). Zone A is bounded 
by the west bank of the Suez Canal and the east coast of the Gulf of 
Suez. Zone B extended from the red line to the green line in the middle 
of the desert. The new arrangement established Zone C, bounded by line 
Bon the west and the international boundary with Israel and the Gulf of 
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While the Egyptian armed forces were permitted to occupy Zone A 
with mechanized forces, infantry, artillery, tanks, etc. and to occupy 
Zone B with light weapons, they were not allowed to be stationed in Zone 
C. Only Egyptian civil police and United Nations forces were to be 
active there. On the other side of the international boundary, Zone D 
was established. This Zone, which has a width of two miles and is 
bounded by line Dis located in the Israeli territories. Israel is not 
allowed to station heavy weapons in this area (Annex I, Article II of 
the Peace Treaty, 1979, p. 8). Both Israel and Egypt established early 
warning systems in Zones D and A respectively. 
According to the peace treaty, as Israeli troops withdrew, the 
United Nations forces were to replace them in the evacuated areas to 
establish a buffer zone between the two armies (Article I-C appendix to 
Annex I of the Peace Treaty, 1979, p. 15). The Israeli withdrawal 
started two months after the peace treaty was signed. The first phase 
of the pullout began on May 25, 1979, with Israeli troops withdrawing 
from the northern part of the Sinai peninsula, including the town of El-
Arish, the most strategic and highly populated city in the region (see 
Figure 23). Other stages of the pullout followed. By June 1980, Israel 
completed its withdrawal from Zones A and B to the interim withdrawal 
line and a buffer zone was established between the two forces. By this 
date Egypt controlled 45,000 km2 out of the 61,000 km2 in the Sinai 
peninsula area (Abdel-Hai, 1991). The final phase of withdrawal came 20 
months later when Israel evacuated the strategic straits of Tiran in 
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the gate of the Gulf of Aqaba, Sharm esh-Sheikh, and the Jewish 
settlements in the west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba and in the area 
between Rafah and El-Arish on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. 
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After completing the withdrawal United Nations peacekeeping forces 
were stationed in Zone C along the border with Israel and in Sharm esh-
Sheikh. The multinational peacekeeping forces in Sinai relied heavily 
on American troops who had performed a peacekeeping role in Sinai since 
the Second Disengagement Agreement of 1975. Out of 2,500 members of the 
multinational force of observers (MFO), 1,200 were American, most of 
them from the 82nd Airborne Division (Mullin, 1982, p. 26). The role of 
the MFO was to monitor the Egyptian-Israeli boundary and the 
implementation of the agreement regarding troop movements. In 1992 
these forces were still stationed there. 
The Rafah Problem 
The members of the joint commission of Israelis and Egyptians 
established to demarcate the international boundary were in disagreement 
on how to treat Palestinians who lived to the south of the international 
border. In the early 1970s, Israeli authorities transferred thousands 
of Palestinians from the northern part of the Gaza Strip to western 
sections of the southern Palestinian town of Rafah, i.e., beyond the 
international boundary into Egyptian territory. In addition, the 
international boundary between Israel and Egypt had become an 
administrative one during the occupation of 1967-79. The Palestinian 
population, which experiences one of the highest rates of natural 
increase in the world at 3.2%, had expanded into Egyptian territory 
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(Benvenisti, M. & Khayat, S., 1988, p. 109). While Egypt demanded the 
reimposition of the international boundary of 1906, Israel proposed 
changes to include Rafah and its new western suburbs within the Gaza 
Strip (Silver, 1982, p. 35). Egypt refused any change in the boundary 
and demanded the transfer of Palestinians to areas within the Gaza 
Strip. A joint task force demarcated the boundary, which cut through 
streets and houses (and families) within Rafah the town and the "Canada" 
refugee camp (a legacy of the Canadian United Nations force stationed 
there during 1957-67). The joint task force agreed to remove the 
Palestinians from their homes in the Canada refugee camp and to resettle 
them within the Gaza Strip. With the help of the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency (UNRWA), most of the residents resettled in Tal-
Essultan, Al-Amal, and "Brazil" building projects ("Brazil" being 
another remnant of the 1957-67 period) (see Figure 24). Today, the 
boundary is made up of two systems of barbed wire fences six meters high 
and fifty meters wide--a created "no man's land." The fences divide the 
two-thirds Israeli-occupied Palestinian Rafah from the Egyptian third of 
the same town (Cohen, 1986, p. 28). 
The Taha Dispute 
The Egypt-Israel boundary extends 210 km from a point near Rafah on 
the Mediterranean Sea to Taha on the Gulf of Aqaba coast. The boundary 
was demarcated in 1906 by 91 pillars. After the Israeli withdrawal of 
1982, 14 pillar locations were disputed between the countries with a 
total area of 10.29 km2 (Mitwali, 1989, pp. 313-315) (see Figure 25). 
During the 1967-79 occupation of the Sinai when the 1906 boundary 
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functioned effectively as an administrative one, Israel did not renew 
the boundary pillars. The disputed pillars were located in three main 
areas: (a) the northern part of the boundary (9 pillars), (b) the 4 
pillars at Ras-en-Nakab area, and (c) pillar No. 91 in Taha, the most 
important one. 
Disputed Area No. 1 (The northern part) 
The area disputed in this part of the boundary totals only 0.79 
km2 • Some of the main factors behind the dispute were the following: 
(a) the area is geographically a desert and unpopulated, meaning 
changing desert features add difficulty in keeping the pillars; (b) the 
northern area of the boundary had been a theater for hostilities since 
1948; (c) both states had been negligent in renewing the boundary 
pillars to good condition; (d) since its inception in 1906, the boundary 
was an administrative one for most of its history (Elkosheri, 1990, p. 
20), and the pillars were less important. (see Table 2) 
Disputed Area No. 2 (Ras en Nagb) 
The area disputed is the largest among the three areas (8.3 km2). 
The strategic importance of this area was the cause of this dispute. 
Elevation is approximately 800 meters, the highest point in that region. 
From that area there is a clear view to the east over Elat and south 
into the Sinai peninsula. Moreover, the area is very rigid, making 
movement very difficult, and contains an important crossroad which links 
Sinai with the Gaza Strip in the north and Elat in the east (Lesch, 
1989, p. 97). (see Table 3) 
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Table 2 
Disputed Area No. 1 
Location (Pillars) Dispute (Distance) Egyptian Claim Israeli Claim 
1 No. 7 55 meters straight line westerly 
between direction 
pillars No. 5 from the 
and No. 8 straight line 
between 
pillar No. 5 
and No. 8 
2 No. 14 15 meters easterly westerly 
location location 
3 No. 15 15 meters easterly westerly 
location location 
4 No. 17 25 meters straight line westerly 
from No. 19 direction 
via No. 18 
5 No. 27 1. 9 meters easterly westerly 
location location 
6 No. 46 3 meters easterly westerly 
location location 
7 No. 51 3 meters easterly westerly 
location location 
8 No. 52 126 meters straight .line southwesterly 
between No. 51 direction 
and No. 53 between 
No. 51 and 
No. 53 
9 No. 56 3 meters easterly westerly 
location location 
Note. (Government of Israel, 1988, pp. 154-170; Mitwali, 1989, p. 313). 
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Table 3 
Disputed Area No. 2 
Location (Pillars) Dispute (Distance) Egyptian Claim Israeli Claim 
1) No. 85 2571 meters easterly westerly 
location location 
2) No. 86 1740 meters easterly westerly 
location location 
3) No. 87 1655 meters easterly westerly 
location location 
4) No. 88 45 meters easterly westerly 
location location 
Note. (Government of Israel, 1988, p. 172; Mitwali, 1989, p. 314). 
Disputed Area No. 3 (Taba) 
The disputed area around the location of pillar No. 91 was the 
focus of the most heated debate. The disputed area at Taba extended for 
approximately 1,000 meters. While Egypt claimed an eastern location on 
the top of Taba Hill, Israel claimed two possible locations farther west 
to include the west bank of Taba Valley (Government of Israel, 1986, p. 
174; Mitwali, 1989, p. 296-97) (see Figure 26) (see Table 3). 
The importance of Taba, a 1.2 km sq. area, derived from five 
considerations. 
1. According to Mohammed Abu-Gazala, the former Egyptian defense 
minister, Taba is a gateway to the Mitla and Gidi passes in central 
Sinai (Abdel Hai, 1991, p. 90). 
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2. Taba contains an important crossroads to Gaza and El-Arish in 
the north and· Sharm esh-Sheikh in the south. 
3. Taba was a tourist attraction, possessing a scenic coastline 
and developed with a 12-storey hotel and recreation village. 
4. Although it is a small area, it borders four different 
countries: Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and, effectively, Saudi Arabia. 
5. Israel has a very narrow coast on the Red Sea. The Taba plane 
is the potential extension of the area around Elat (Abdel Hai, 1991, p. 
90; Al-Rashidi, 1990, p. 81; Lesch, 1989, p. 96). 
The Taba Arbitration 
Article VII of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty states: "Disputes 
arising out of the application or interpretation of this treaty shall be 
resolved by negotiation." Moreover, "[A]ny such disputes which cannot 
be settled by negotiation shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted 
to arbitration." The Israeli army and civilians completed their 
evacuation of Sinai on April 25, 1982. The war in Lebanon which started 
40 days later found the Israeli government distracted from dealing with 
the boundary dispute. In addition,- Israel-Egypt relations cooled after 
the invasion. With the help of mediation organized with the support of 
the Reagan adminis.tration, the two countries agreed to move to the line 
claimed by the other side and the area between the two lines to be under 
MFO jurisdiction (Al-Rashid, ,1990, p. 106; Lesch, 1989, p. 96). 
During the years 1983-86, Egypt wanted a mandatory solution to the 
problem which demanded the solving of the fourteen disputed points by 
arbitration, but the Israeli government insisted upon conciliation. In 
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September 1986, after four years of negotiations, they finally agreed to 
arbitration. The two countries set the conditions, rules, and time 
tables, plus agreed on an arbitration panel led by former president of 
the Swedish Supreme Court, Judge Gunnar Lagergen. The arbitrations 
refer to the location of the boundary's disputed pillars after the 
demarcation of 1906 and at the time of the British Mandate of Palestine. 
Moreover, it was agreed that the tribunal did not have the power to 
suggest locations for the pillars other than those claimed by Egypt or 
Israel (Lesch, 1989, p. 111; El-Kosheri, 1990, p. 10). 
On May 13, 1987, each country submitted to the arbitration panel 
its memorial explaining its claims supported by documents and maps. 
Later on June 12 of that year, both parties submitted their responses to 
the other's position (counter-memorials). Each responded to the 
opposing side's claims adding supporting documents and maps. The final 
phase of the arbitration was the rejoinder of each country which was 
submitted on March 1, 1988. Both countries submitted general 
observations and additional pieces of evidence which referred to old 
claims at critical points and responses to the.counter-memorials. 
During the arbitration process, the legal adviser of the U.S. Department 
of State, Abraham Sofer, tried unsuccessfully to reach an out-of-court 
settlement (Abdel Hai, 1991, p. 123). The tribunal, which held its 
meetings in Geneva, visited the disputed.points on February 17, 1988 
(Al-Rashidi, 1990~ p. 108). 
On September 29, 1988, the arbitration tribunal gave its decision 
publicly regarding the 14 disputed points. It decided in favor of the 
Egyptian claims in 10 out of the 14. Israel won on the less important 
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points in the boundary where only a few square meters were in question. 
The tribunal decided in favor of Egypt in the following boundary· 
pillars: 7, 17, 27, 51 and 52 in the northern sector of the boundary, 
and pillars 85, 86, 87 and 88 in Ras en Naqb irt the southern sector, and 
in the most important pillar location, No. 91 in Taba (Mitwali, 1989, 
pp. 372-73; Al-Rashidi, 1990, p. 135). 
The tribunals decisions were based on several points. 
1. The tribunal did not accept Israel's claim of mistaken 
demarcation in 1906 or the claim that some pillars were originally not 
sited properly based on the 1906 accord, although some revelant evidence 
exists (see Chapter 4). The panel was concerned only with the correct 
location of the pillars as originally sited (Lesch, 1989, p. 95). 
2. Israel penetrated the boundary and occuped part of Sinai in 
1948. It signed an armistice demarcation agreement with Egypt and never 
claimed sovereignty over Taba or the other disputed points (Lesch, 
1989, p. 95; Rizk, 1989, p. 48). 
3. The situation was similar in 1956, when Israel occupied Sinai 
and withdrew after a few months. The UN peacekeeping forces, which were 
stationed in the border between 1956-67, confirmed the Egyptian 
claims (Rizik, 1989, p. 49). 
4. Israel was not confident about the exact location of pillar No. 
91. It suggested to the tribunal two possible sites: 91A at.the 
granite knob and 91B at Bir Taba (Rejoinder of Israel, 1988, pp. 131-
32) (see Figure 26). 
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5. The pillars were constructed in 1906 according to the principle 
of intervisibility, that each pillar can be seen from the one adjacent 
to it, and the court maintained this principle (Rizik, 1989, p. 329). 
· The_ Egyptian delegation had been able to bring to the tribunal two 
different official Israeli maps, the first from 1964 with Bir Taba about 
700 meters west of the boundary, i.e. within Egypt, and the second from 
1983 which shows the. same place 300 meters east of the boundary, i.e. 
within Israel (Rizik, 1989, p. 357). 
Israel accepted arbitration and withdrew from the Taba area on 
March 15, 1989. The disputed pillars were fixed according to the 
tribunal's decisions. Egypt paid $40 million in compensation to Israeli 
developers hotel owner in Taba (Abdel Hai, 1991, p. 240). 
Immigration and Settlement 
Since the early days, the World Zionist Organization had been 
interested in purchasing land along the Egyptian frontier.· Several 
attempts to acquire land in the Egyptian frontier occured. In 1890 a 
Jewish activist named Pol Friedman leading a group of twenty Jewish 
people tried to settle on the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba (El-Deeb, 1979, 
pp. 115-16). In 1903, the founder of the World Zionist Organization, 
Theodore Hertz!, suggested the establishment of a Jewish State in El-
Arish and the Sinai peninsula (Jolan, 1987, p. 7). Other attempts to 
acquire lands in Rafah and El-Arish occurred in 1905 and in 1907, but 
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all of these were rejected by Lord Cromer (Walach, 1975, p. 38), though 
Cromer thought they had influenced Ottoman attitudes in 1906 (see chapt. 
4). 
The creation of the 1906 boundary didn't discourage Jewish attempts 
at settlement in the Egyptian frontier. In 1919, President Weizmann 
wrote to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, to ask for an 
apportionment of "the desolated land in southern Erets Yisrael for 
Jewish settlement" (Waingradov, 1965, p. 303). 
The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 permitted further 
Jewish settlement along the Egyptian frontier. In the late 1940s and 
early 1950s several Jewish settlements were erected, the most well-
known being Elat on the Red Sea (near the former Urnrn-Rashrash), and 
Nizzana (the former Auja), Gevolot and .Kerem Shalom in the northern 
edges of the boundary (Atlas of Israel, 1970, pp. 1, 12). The concept 
of frontier settlements is well-known in the thinking of Israeli policy-
makers. This doctrine holds that Jewish settlements on the frontiers 
help to stablize and shape the boundary. Many factors influence this 
way of thinking. The Israeli government since 1967 has accelerated the 
construction of settlements alongside the boundary and inside the 
occupied territories for several reasons (Naveh, 1975, pp. 26-27). 
1. In the Israeli view, its borders are disproportionately long in 
comparison to its territory, rendering the borders very difficult to 
defend, especially when surrounded by hostile neighbors. 
2. The size of the Israeli armed forces and its military 
capability in the event of confrontations with Arab states along the 
borders is thought to be out of balance with the military capabilities 
of the surrounding Arab countries. Building settlements near. the 
borders is taken to enhance Israel's capability. 
3. Some Israeli commentators argue that the Israeli Government 
built settlements to make compromise very difficult. 
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4. The settlements on the frontiers improve the morale of Israeli 
soldiers and civilians in the urban and interior areas. 
5. In the case of negotiations, cease-fire lines are often taken 
to be not as permanent as settlement lines. Concentrating Jewish 
settlements along Israel's frontiers is seen to enhance the government's 
position in peace negotiations. 
According to Dani Rozoluo, an Israeli official, the last campaign 
in the 1948 War was a settlement campaign on the frontier. Military 
units were taken to settlements on the frontier to protect it (Rozoluo, 
1975, p. 43). 
The occupation of the Sinai peninsula and Gaza Strip in June of 
1967 was followed by the establishment of Jewish settlements across 
those areas. On the eve of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai there were 19 
settlements. Eleven were in Pethat Rafiah, i.e. in the area between 
Rafah and El-Arish, and the other 8 settlements were scattered 
throughout the peninsula (see Figure 27). Five thousand Jewish settlers 
lived there (Mullin, 1982, p. 25). By 1990 there were 19 Jewish 
settlements in the Gaza Strip inhabited by approximately 5000 settlers 
(The Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1991-1992; United Nations Relief 
Works Agency, 1990, p. 1). Israel withdrew from these settlements in 
April, 1982, as a result of the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, p. 293). 
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Functions of the Boundary and Economic Relations 
Since its establishment, the Egypt-Palestin/Israel boundary has 
passed through different phases of development which have affected 
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its function. Prior to World War I the boundary was formal. After the 
delimitation of 1906, Bedouins continued to cross it for their own 
purposes. Between the two world wars the boundary became an 
administrative one between the British Protectorate of Egypt and in the 
northern and eastern Sinai and the British administration of the Negev. 
The British authorities enforced measures of supervision over the 
movement of Bedouins for tax matters and to prevent smuggling and 
violence (Brawer, 1979, p. 373). 
The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the Armistice 
demarcation line which followed drastically altered the boundary in its 
functions. With movements of the Bedouin tribes sealed, many tribes 
were either deported or moved into the Egyptian territories. Between 
the years 1949-67, following Jewish settlements on the frontier with 
Egypt, the boundary became an ethnic one separating two ethnic groups, 
Arabs and Jews (Brawer, 1979, p. 374). 
The occupation of Gaza Strip and Sinai in 1967 changed the nature 
of the boundary back from international-political to administrative. 
Due to intensive Jewish settlement during 1967-79, especially in the 
northern boundary sector, the border was opened for free movement. The 
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the evacuation of the Jewish 
settlements restored the boundary to an international and ethnic 
separation line. The peace Treaty of .1979 specified that "full, normal 
diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt would be established" 
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(Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, 1979, p·. 24). As Israel started its 
pullout from Sinai in 1979, the two countries established diplomatic 
relations. In 1980, three traffic check points along the boundary were 
opened, two of them along the edges of the boundary in Rafah and Taba. 
Both checkpoints opened to serve the movement of tourists and trade. 
The last checkpoint is in Nissana and serves trade movement only. 
In 1979 and 1980, Israel and Egypt signed 55 separate commercial, 
cultural and scientific exchange agreements (Smith, 1983, p. 17). In 
the trade arena, oil is the leading commodity between the two countries. 
As part of the Peace Treaty, Egypt is providing Israel 40,000 barrels of 
oil per day. The value of the oil trade in 1982 was estimated at $600 
million (Benin, 1985, p. 6). Other Egyptian trade with Israel ammounted 
to $700 million in 1982 and $800 million in the first eight months of 
1983 (Smith, 1983, p. 17). Israel tried to balance its trade with Egypt 
mainly with agricultural products. In 1980 Israeli exports to Egypt 
totaled $12 million. It rose to $25 million in 1982, but due to the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon, export figures dropped to $6 million in the 
first three quarters of 1983 (Smith, 1983, p. 17). The cold peace 
between the two countries following the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai 
was based on the Taba dispute, the invasion of Lebanon, and the 
unprogressive nature of negotiations over the issue of "autonomy" for 
Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. All these factors 
prevented Egypt from normalization of relations and cooperation with 
Israel. 
The dramatic element in trade came with Israeli tourists visiting 
Egypt. This tourist trade was one-sided and was strongly affected by 
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the political conditions following the Peace Treaty .. Besides air 
services between the two countries, there is a daily bus service from 
Tel-Aviv to Cairo via the Rafah checkpoint. Tens of thousands of 
Israelis benefited from the agreement signed in October of 1981 in 
allowing tourism between the two countries. However, in contrast, very 
few Egyptians have visited Israel. In 1982, 30,000 Israelis visited 
Egypt but only 4,300 Egyptians made their way to Israel. For the first 
three quarters of 1983 the figures dropped to 25,000 and 1,800 
respectively. Between 1979-83, 200,000 Israelis visisted Egypt (Miller, 
1983, p. 16). Despite incidents of violence against Israeli tourists in 
Egypt, Israelis--especially Palestinians with Israeli passports--
continue to travel to Egypt. The maximum figure of Egyptian tourists 
visiting Israel was 5,100 in 1987. In 1988, 3,741 Egyptians visited 
Israel and 4,235 and 3,348 in the following years respectively 
(Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1991, pp. 58-62). 
Although the two countries hoped for more cooperation and mass 
movement through the border, especially Israel, the normalization 
process with its three-dimensional diplomatic, economic, and cultural 
channels was greatly influenced by the total political environment in 
the region. At a seminar held in 1989 by the Jaffa Center for Strategic 
Studies at the University of Tel-Aviv to discuss the "ten years of peace 
with Egypt", some scholars argued that the main factor which determines 
Egyptian foreign policy with Israel is its own domestic problems, since 
it is a society with a large natural increase in population. The 
conflict in the Middle East was interpreted a struggle between two 
systems with different values and interpretations. Conditions such as 
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these make it very difficult for warm relations to exist between 
Egyptians and Israelis. Egypt maintains the position that the core of 
the Israeli-Arab conflict is the Palestinians: if this problem is 
solved, the others will be solved by themselves (Mirhav, 1989, p. 64). 
CHAPTER 9 
SUMMARY 
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This essay has provided a continuous descriptive account of the 
Egypt-Palestine/Israel boundary from 1841 to present. The roots of the 
Egypt-Palestine/Israeli boundary originated in Mohammed Ali's ambition 
to seize ultimate power in the region when he invaded Syria in 1831. 
The intervention of European powers forced Ali to withdraw his troops 
from Syria. In return the Sultan of Istanbul gave Ali's lineage 
hereditary rule over Egypt. In his Firman of 1841, the Sultan 
determined the eastern limits of Egypt by a straight line extended from 
Suez to a point between Rafah and Khan Yonis on the Mediterranean coast. 
It served as an administrative line within the Ottoman Empire. Ali did 
not accept the new line and continued to exercise control over Sinai and 
three forts along the west coast of Arabia for the coming decades. The 
operation of the Suez Canal in 1869 increased European rivalry and 
colonial activity in the area. This rivalry began earlier in India and 
was followed by Napolean's occupation of Egypt in 1798. The British, 
who were the main users of and benefactors from the Suez Canal, desired 
strong unilateral control over the area to protect their highly 
strategic maritime route to India. The French wanted to gain maximum 
political and economic benefits as the ones responsible for building the 
canal and, moreover, wanted to disrupt the British route to India. 
Facing a real internal threat by an Egyptian nationalist movement and 
the state of economic bankruptcy and anarchy which existed in Egypt at 
that time, Great Britain moved to take advantage of the situation by 
occupying Egypt in 1882. 
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Unlike other provinces within the Ottoman Empire, Egypt always had 
a certain degree of autonomy. This increased during Ali's reign from 
1806-48. The British occupation of Egypt enhanced this trend towards 
weakening of Ottoman control. One of the most important goals of the 
British invasion of Egypt was the protection of the Suez Canal. The 
issue of the eastern Egyptian boundary was on the British agenda in 
1892. In his Firman of investiture to Khedive Abbas II Hilmi, the 
Ottoman Sultan failed to mention Sinai and the eastern Egyptian 
boundary. The British Government represented by Lord Cromer, the 
British Agent in Egypt, demanded and received a new Firman, stating: 
"the status quo is maintained in the same manner as it was administered 
at the time of your grandfather [of Khedive Abbas II Hilmi] ... and 
your father" (Toye, 1989, p. 59). For the British it was formal 
acknowledgement of the Egyptian (British) rule over Sinai. 
The issue of the boundary arose early in January 1906 when the 
British Governor of Egypt started to take greater interest in Sinai and 
the eastern border. A geopolitical power struggle ensued between the 
Britian and Ottoman empires which came close to a military 
confrontation. The British wanted to keep the Sinai peninsula as a 
buffer zone to protect the Suez Canal and did not accept several 
proposed Ottoman compromises, thus forcing the demarcation of the Rafah-
Aqaba line upon the Ottomans. In accordance with an agreement signed 
between Cairo and Istanbul on September 13, 1906, a joint commission 
demarcated the 210 km line as an administrative one within the Ottoman 
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Empire. They constructed 91 pillars keeping the principle of 
intervisibility between the pillars. The British, being well aware of 
the Ottoman weaknesses, achieved their goals and controlled both sides 
of the Suez Canal. 
The end of the First World War brought a new reality to the Middle 
East as well as the rest of the world. The defeat of Turkey and its 
renunciation of any title over Egypt, Palestine, and the rest of its 
former empire, led to new arrangements between the European powers. 
Beginning in 1922, Great Britain was awarded, as a Mandate, Palestine. 
Earlier, during 1918-20, there were several proposals made to change the 
Rafah-Aqaba line, but the 1906 line remained as a compromise between 
several suggested lines. 
Although there were some appeals made and legal questions raised 
about the sovereignty of Egypt over Sinai, the Rafah-Aqaba line survived 
and emerged as a stable and permanent boundary. The dramatic events of 
two world wars, Egypt's independence, the British Mandate over 
Palestine, the United Nation's Partition Plan of 1947, and the creation 
of the State of Israel in 1948: all of these events failed to alter the 
Rafah-Aqaba line of 1906. 
For the first time since its demarcation, the boundary changed when 
Egypt and Israel signed the Armistice Agreement of February 1949. The 
Armistice Line followed the boundary line of 1906, except around Gaza 
Strip; however, the boundary's status changed in terms of its definition 
as a boundary line only, not as a political or territorial border. 
Moreover, the boundary became sealed to movement and served as an ethnic 
separation line, with a demilitarized zone established around Auja on 
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the Israeli side of the border and limited defensive positions in the 
area allowed within Egypt opposing .the Auja area. As one of the 
outcomes of the Agreement, the Gaza Strip was formed in.the souththwest 
corner of Palestine. 
The triple attack on Egypt in 1956 by Israel, France and Great 
Britain led to a temporary change in the boundary line. For a brief 
period, Israel had a line extended for a great distance alongside the 
Suez Canal, just 10 km distant. Moreover, after the Israeli withdrawal, 
the 1956 War brought certain changes in the border system. While the 
boundary line itself remained untouched, United Nations Emergency Forces 
entered S·inai in 1957 to monitor the border in the coming ten years. 
During 1957-67, the Egypt-Israel border was the quietest among the Arab-
Israeli borders. 
This situation was altered during the first half of 1967. Tensions 
escalated along the border between Israel and Egypt due to tensions 
along other Syrian-Israeli frontiers and the Egyptian decisions to close 
the Straits of Tiran to ships sailing to Elat and to send the United 
Nations Emergency Forces home in May 1967. Following a strike on June 5 
of that year, the sealed armistice line of 1949 was altered in its 
nature and location, replaced by a cease fire line along the Suez Canal 
and the Gulf of Suez. The Rafah-Aqaba line became an administrative 
line between Israel and the territories of Sinai and the Gaza Strip 
which it occupied. While the Armistice demarcation system was based on 
bilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1949, the cease fire 
system was based on United Nations resolutions. The nature of the cease 
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fire system was unstable. Although it.survived the War of Attrition of 
1969-71, it collapsed in October 1973. 
The October War of 1973-which was initiated by Egypt and Syria-and 
its military and geopolitical.outcomes led to intense political 
activity. PossiQle confrontations between the superpowers during the 
war, the subsequent oil embargo, and the new lines created by the 
Egyptian and Israeli militaries .convinced Washington and Moscow that the 
status quo on the Middle East was no longer bearable. After intensive 
diplomatic efforts in the area by the Nixon Administration,. Egypt and 
Israel concluded two disengagement agreements. The first was in January 
1974, and the second was in Septemeber 1975. The disengagement front 
line system differed from the former cease fire and Armistice systems. 
While it was similar to the Armistice system as a bilateral agreement, 
it differed in that it was limited in time, and required annual renewal 
by the Security Council of the United Nations. Moreover, the 
disengagement agreement was based on three lines, not one, as were the 
previous systems. It followed the principle of establishing a 
demilitarized zone controlled by UN forces which separated a thin zone 
of light Egyptian and Israeli forces. 
The momentum of political activity continued after the Second 
Disengagement Agreement of September 1975. In November 1977, Egyptian 
President Anwar El-Sadat visited Israel. The conclusion of the Camp 
David Agreement followed, as did the Peace Treaty of 1979. Israel 
withdrew from the Sinai peninsula during 1979-82 and moved back behind 
the Rafah-Aqaba line. The few locations along the boundary line which 
were disputed were finalized after arbitration accepted by the two 
countries. 
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The 1906 boundary antecedent by 42 years to the establishment of 
the State of Israel has survived many dramatic events. Although it was 
penetrated several times in both directions, it remains as it was 
demarcated in 1906. The boundary line, superimposed by imperial 
interests, gained ultimate permanence and stability after the Egypt-
Israel Peace Treaty of 1982. It functions in 1992 as a mutually 
accepted international boundary and allows citizens interaction between 
states. 
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